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1 
1. Introduction
1.1. Topic and Methodology of this Thesis 
During the last few decades, arbitration has taken the world of international commercial 
legal disputes by storm, and the general reasons for this development are readily apparent: 
as international relationships between companies become increasingly common, there also 
arises a need for a way to settle disputes that both parties see as reliable, objective and 
trustworthy. It is understandably risky for a company to allow a resolution of a dispute to 
fall into the hands of a foreign tribunal and an unfamiliar legal system, as such a situation 
would put the said company at a severe disadvantage. As arbitration provides freedom to 
choose the procedural rules followed and the arbitrators who finally resolve the dispute, it 
is easy to understand why companies would have a preference for arbitration.
1
 It should
also be noted, that arbitration awards are often more easily enforced than their national 
court counterparts due to the wide adoption of the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (henceforth referred to as the 
New York Convention). Said convention forces national courts to enforce arbitrational 
awards, unless severe procedural problems or issues exist with the integrity of the 
arbitration process. Currently, almost 150 countries are party to the New York Convention, 
which further increases the appeal of arbitration as a replacement for national court 
proceedings.
2
While the general reasons for the popularity of international arbitration are fairly easy to 
recognise, there exists debate on the actual advantages of an arbitration process. While the 
neutrality, flexibility and confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings, as well as the 
ability to appoint experts as arbitrators, are generally agreed upon as clear assets of 
arbitration over national court proceedings, some of its aspects can be seen as both 
disadvantageous and advantageous. For example, it could be said that the lack of the right 
to appeal quickly leads to the final resolution of a dispute, eliminating excruciatingly long 
proceedings often seen in national court systems. However, if the arbitrators make a 
decision that is clearly wrong, a party might be tied to this resolution without any means to 
1 Baum 2005 p. 52, Frände et al. 2012 p. 1306 and Gaillard – Savage 1999 p. 1. 
2 Moses 2008 p. 3. 
2 
correct it.
3
 Other often-cited advantages of arbitration are its low costs and short length of
the process as compared to proceedings in national courts. In theory, both points stand: the 
flexibility of the arbitrational process, the lack of previous cases to refer to and the ability 
to choose experts as arbitrators generally lead to swift and cost-effective resolutions of 
disputes. In practice, however, this might not always be the case. Lengthy and complex 
arbitration proceedings can last for a significantly long time, while the fees of the 
arbitrators are substantial and can severely increase the cost of the process.
4
As discussed before, one of the clearest advantages of arbitration is its flexibility. This is 
especially apparent in an international setting, as the parties often come from different 
legal backgrounds and systems. Because international arbitration is not based on strictly 
regulated structures, but instead can be moulded by the parties to fit their needs, parties 
often need to decide a system that both parties are comfortable with. This clash between 
legal backgrounds is prominent when it comes to presenting evidence. Parties from a 
common law background are more familiar with compulsory document production and 
large-scale discovery procedures than their civil law counterparts. Additionally, it is not 
just the parties who come from different legal backgrounds: the arbitrators, who are usually 
chosen by the parties, also often represent different legal views and systems. These 
situations force the parties, and the arbitral tribunal, to find a middle ground between the 
discovery and civil law procedures.
5
 Recently, it seems that in international arbitrations it
has been more common for the document production proceedings to lean more heavily 
toward the civil law system, while the oral phase is modelled after common law practices. 
This means that a party is often required to present its arguments together with all the 
documentary evidence it considers to support the arguments, as opposed to common law 
practice where written evidence is presented and consulted before submitting arguments. 
Conversely, it is usual to allow common law practices when orally examining witnesses.
6
However, this kind of hybrid system is not without problems. For example, because the 
civil law procedures for document production allow parties to withhold evidence they see 
as adverse to their case, a party can abuse it by not presenting documents that are vital to a 
3 Moses 2008 p. 4-5. 
4 Lew et al. 2003 p. 8-9. 
5 Griffin 2000 p. 19, Inkeroinen 2007 p. 77-78 and Knuts 2007 p. 201-202. 
6 Gaillard – Savage 1999 p. 690-691. 
3 
correct resolution of the dispute.
7
 To address these kinds of problems, and to harmonize the
practices of international arbitration, the International Bar Association has drafted Rules on 
the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (later referred to simply as the IBA 
Rules). These rules, first adopted in 1983 as the Supplementary Rules Governing the 
Presentation and Reception of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, are 
meant to offer a flexible, hybrid system between civil and common law procedures. The 
IBA Rules can be adopted as fully binding, amended as the parties see fit or simply used as 
general guidelines while negotiating the procedures to be followed.
8
 As such, the IBA
Rules are considered to be some of the most referred to and useful rules for situations 
involving parties from differing legal backgrounds
9
.
The IBA Rules have, since their first adoption in 1983, gone through two major revisions. 
The first revision, published in 1999, saw major changes made to the contents of the rules, 
as well as the changing of the name to the Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International 
Commercial Arbitration. While the 1983 version remained relatively obscure and 
uninfluential to the international arbitration scene, the 1999 version of the IBA Rules 
became some of the most influential, effective and widely used guidelines in international 
arbitration. The most recent version of the rules was adopted in 2010, omitting the term 
commercial from the name, and aimed to improve the effectiveness, clarity and cost 
effectiveness of the rules, as well as address any new issues that have arisen since the 
adoption of the 1999 rules.
10
 As the rules have been revised so recently, and are still
gaining in popularity, they are an excellent target for closer inspection and analysis. It 
should also be noted, that so far relatively little has been written about the revised rules, 
especially from a civil law point of view.  
Of course, the recent amendment of the IBA Rules is not the sole reason for choosing the 
said rules as the topic of this thesis. As the rules aim to provide a system of evidence 
production that sits in the middle between civil and common law procedures, as well as 
promote the best practices followed in international arbitrations, they are an exceptionally 
interesting focus for a thesis. While a full analysis of the whole revised IBA Rules would 
certainly be a compelling task, I have restricted the topic of this thesis to the parts of the 
7 Griffin 2000 p. 19. 
8 Griffin 2000 p. 21 and Moses 2008 p. 165. 
9 Griffin 2000 p. 21. 
10 Segesser 2010 p. 736-737 and Blackaby et al. 2009 p. 79. 
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IBA Rules dealing with document production, and the consequences of failing to present 
the required documents. As the clear majority of international arbitrations are ultimately 
dependant on the fact finding process, evidentiary proceedings have always been a relevant 
topic for legal discussion
11
. This means that this thesis, for the most part, concerns itself 
with articles 3 and 9 of the IBA Rules. This, however, does not mean that there is no 
mention of the other articles, as they are referenced and analysed when necessary for the 
main focus of this thesis. It should also be noted that, since the IBA Rules are strictly 
limited to commercial arbitration, so is this thesis. 
As this thesis predominantly concerns the IBA Rules, there is no large-scale, in-depth 
analysis of other possible rules or models for international arbitration in this thesis. 
However, completely limiting the scope to the IBA Rules would lead to a severely 
restricted and simplified point of view. To provide both alternative and supportive 
viewpoints and options, I mention and analyse other rules and guidelines, such as the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
when it is necessary for exemplary or comparative purposes. These same principles are 
also applied to national legislation, especially during the parts of the thesis dealing with the 
differences between common and civil law systems. As the IBA Rules are ultimately based 
on legal principles that are most clearly represented in national legislation, it would be 
needlessly complicated to try to represent these principles in this thesis without 
occasionally delving into national legislation. 
Since the main focus of this thesis is a particular set of rules, it then naturally follows that 
this thesis predominantly uses the method of legal dogmatics. This method is applied to 
interpret and analyse not only the IBA Rules, but other so-called soft law instruments as 
well. These include, among others, the aforementioned UNCITRAL Arbitration rules as 
well as rules drafted by prominent arbitral institutions such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce. This thesis also presents and analyses national legislation, when such analysis 
is appropriate and necessary to illustrate a point of view or an important tradition in 
international arbitration. In addition to the traditional dogmatic approach, a comparative 
method is used to further draw attention to both the positive and the negative aspects of the 
IBA Rules, as well as the current notable trends and traditions in international arbitration. 
                                                 
11 Blackaby et al. 2009 p. 384-385. 
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Lastly, it should be noted that while the newest IBA Rules no longer carry the word 
“commercial” in their title, this thesis is mostly focused on what traditionally has been 
referred to as international commercial arbitration. While there does not exist a single, 
universal definition for the term commercial, it is most often understood to exclude 
disputes between states that are governed by public international law.
12
 This is the 
approach chosen for this thesis. However, it is important to note that the 2010 IBA Rules 
omitted the term “commercial” from the name due to the rules’ applicability to investment 
arbitration. This applicability was stems from the perceived similarities in evidentiary 
procedures of commercial and investment arbitration, resulting from the trend of global 
harmonisation of arbitral proceedings discussed in chapter 2.1.
13
 Therefore, what is 
presented in this thesis could be applied to investment arbitration in addition to commercial 
arbitration. However, investment arbitration or its specific attributes are not discussed in 
this thesis. 
1.2. Research Questions and Structure 
The research questions of this thesis can be summed up into three points: 
1) Under the IBA Rules, what are the rights and duties of the parties to an 
international arbitration when it comes to document production? 
2) Under the IBA Rules, what powers do the arbitrators have with regard to requesting 
and enforcing document production, as well as reacting to a party failing or 
refusing to produce requested documents? 
3) How well do the revised IBA Rules achieve their aim of providing the best 
practices of document production in international arbitration? 
As context is important to properly understand the aims and text of the current IBA Rules 
of Evidence, chapter 2 is focused on essential background information. The first part of 
chapter 2 deals with the general history, trends and procedural framework of document 
production in international arbitration. This chapter also describes the prominent attributes 
of both civil and common law systems for document production. This is done to later 
illustrate how the IBA Rules blend both systems. The later portion of chapter 2 shifts the 
focus on the IBA Rules, providing a brief overview of the International Bar Association, as 
                                                 
12 Bühring-Uhle et al. 2006 p. 33-34. 
13 Böckstiegel 2009 p. 298. 
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well as the history of the IBA Rules of Evidence. This chapter provides the needed 
perspective and background, through which the aims of the IBA Rules and the rules 
themselves can be analysed and interpreted. Chapter 3 is mostly dedicated to the IBA 
Rules article 3. This means that in this chapter the focus is on the powers and duties of the 
parties regarding document production. As the aforementioned chapter focused on the 
parties, chapter 4 concerns itself with the arbitrators and their powers. These are, for the 
most part, regulated in the IBA Rules articles 3 and 9. The last chapter provides a concise 
summary of the changes made to the IBA Rules in the 2010 revision while presenting the 
conclusions reached through the analysis outlined in previous chapters. As the first two 
research questions are addressed in chapters 3 and 4, respectively, the final chapter focuses 
on the final research question. 
2. Framework of Document Production in International Arbitration 
2.1. A Look at the History of International Arbitration and the IBA Rules 
 From National Legislation towards Centralized Practice 2.1.1.
The history of international arbitration can be traced as far back as the myths and legends 
of ancient Greece. While there certainly exists evidence of ancient judicial systems that 
could be described as arbitration and some procedures between city-states even closely 
resembling the modern international arbitration practice, for the purposes of this thesis the 
ancient origins of the practice are best left as a brief mention.
14
 
The current ongoing development of modern international arbitration practice can be said 
to have begun in the 19
th
 century. At the time arbitration between states was still tied to 
national legislation, which led to a plethora of different practices concerning the 
recognition of arbitral awards. Every state applied its own laws when it came to arbitration 
proceedings. Arbitration was even seen as a threat to the national court proceedings, and 
thus states sought to control and regulate international arbitration in the name of 
sovereignty.
15
 However, during this time period some states had already drafted arbitration 
agreements with other states. An example of such agreements is 1794 Jay’s Treaty between 
                                                 
14 Born 2014 p. 9-10. 
15 Lew et al. 2003 p. 16. 
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the United States and Great Britain, aimed to settle dispute arising from the recent civil war 
between the two. Agreements like the Jay’s Treaty would pave the way for more global 
and harmonized regulation of international arbitration.
16
 
Even before the First World War, international commerce had constantly become more 
common, but after the war the global attitude toward international relations became 
idealistic. In consequence, the interest in an established practice for international 
commercial arbitration saw a marked incline, leading to establishing the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and its International Court of Arbitration.
17
 While the actual 
arbitrations handled by the ICC were, and still remain, fairly rare compared to ad hoc 
arbitrations, the main importance of the ICC lies with its other work. The ICC recognized 
the main problems of international arbitration, namely the unenforceability of arbitration 
agreements and awards in foreign countries. To address these problems, the ICC promoted 
and helped adopt the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, and the 1927 Geneva 
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Awards. However, both of these documents were 
far from problem-free, and thus would later be almost completely replaced by the New 
York Convention.
18
 
 The New York Convention: Towards Harmonisation 2.1.2.
The end of the Second World War saw history repeating itself, as international commerce 
boomed, which in turn led to more focus on international arbitration procedures. As both 
the 1923 and 1927 Conventions still generally required an arbitral award to be reviewed by 
national courts to be enforceable in a foreign country, the process was far from fluid and 
unified. To address these problems, the ICC created a draft convention promoting a system 
that would leave international arbitration outside national law. However, such a drastic 
break from national autonomy was not yet decidedly popular, so the United Nations took 
upon itself to review the ICC draft and create its own draft. Both the UN draft and the ICC 
draft were considered and amended together, and finally a compromise was reached. The 
                                                 
16 Born 2014 p. 11-12. 
17 Mustill 1989 p. 48. 
18 Lew et al. 2003 p. 19-20 and Mustill 1989 p. 48-49. 
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resulting text was adopted in 1958 as the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
19
 
The importance of the New York Convention to the field of international arbitration cannot 
be overstated: it is one of the most widely adopted international conventions of all time 
and, after half a century, still continues to be relevant to arbitral proceedings
20
. As national 
courts apply and interpret the convention, they also look to the cases handled by foreign 
courts, thus almost automatically harmonising international arbitration practices and 
regulations. Additionally, since the adoption of the convention, it has become commonly 
accepted that the parties to the convention will enforce foreign arbitration agreements and 
awards.
21
 While concerning itself with only a relatively small area of international 
arbitration procedure, the New York Convention paved way for more robust harmonisation 
efforts, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
22
 
 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Model Law and Current Trend of Harmonisation 2.1.3.
As the use of ad hoc arbitration became increasingly common in international disputes, it 
became apparent that there was a need for a common set of rules to be used in such 
situations. To address this issue, the UN Commission on Trade Law (UNCITRAL) drafted 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which were specifically created for use in ad hoc 
arbitrations. The rules were adopted in 1976.
23
 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were designed to provide a unified and predictable 
legal framework for international ad hoc arbitration, but still remain flexible enough to 
address the varying needs of the parties. As such, the rules were meant to be accepted in 
both civil and common law systems, as well as any other system. As the UNCITRAL 
                                                 
19 Lew et al. 2003 p. 20-21. 
20 At the moment of writing, 149 nations are parties to the New York Convention. Source (referenced on the 
9th  of June, 2014): http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.  
21 Lew et al. 2003 p. 21-22 and Mustill 2008 p. 11-12. While often referred to as the most important 
convention in the area of international arbitration, the New York Convention was by no means the only 
influential convention out there. Other conventions that bear mention are The European Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration of 1961, The Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, and The Convention on the Settlement by Arbitration 
of Civil Law Disputes Resulting From Economic Scientific and Technical Co-operation of 1972, among 
others. For more information on these conventions, see for example Lew et al. 2003 p. 22-24 and Born 2014 
p. 116-125.  
22 Mustill 1989 p. 52. 
23 Lew et al. 2003 p. 26. 
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Arbitration Rules were the first of their kind, they would herald the emergence of later 
similarly designed rules, such as the IBA Rules.
24
 
The New York Convention created a global atmosphere of unity in the field of 
international arbitration, and thus provided common ground for the development of 
common accepted international arbitration practices. However, as these practices became 
more and more prominent, the problems of diverse national arbitration legislation became 
impossible to ignore. Some nations held strict control over arbitration proceedings, while 
others shied away from almost any state interference. In addition, some countries had 
either outdated or non-existent arbitration legislation. To address these issues, the UN 
embarked to draft a set of arbitration rules that would reflect the best accepted practices 
and standards of international arbitration. This process resulted in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, published in 1985.
25
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law was designed with the purpose of it being implemented by 
national legislators, thus harmonising international commercial arbitration rules across all 
nations. For this purpose, the model law is extensive and deals with every aspect of 
international commercial arbitration in great detail, providing legislation that is directly 
applicable if adopted. To maintain the flexibility and advantages of arbitration, the model 
law is based on the ideas of party autonomy and minimal state interference. Since its 
adoption the UNCITRAL Model Law has had significant influence on the ongoing process 
of harmonisation in the field of international commercial arbitration.
26
 
Both the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the Model Law, among other rules drafted 
during the same time period,
27
 have served as significant stepping stones in the process of 
harmonising international commercial arbitration. They have had immense influence on 
later arbitration rules and practices worldwide and still continue to be some of the most 
applied and referenced arbitration rules. Ultimately, this ongoing harmonisation process 
                                                 
24 Born 2014 p. 171-173 and Mustill 2008 p. 14-15. 
25 Lew et al. 2003 p. 27. 
26 Born 2014 p. 134-140 and Lew et al. 2003 p. 27-28. Currently legislation based on  the UNCITRAL Model 
Law has been enacted in over 60 states worldwide. Source (referenced on the 9th of June, 2014): 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html.  
27 Major international arbitral institutions commonly drafted their own versions of arbitration rules. Examples 
include the 1975 Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, the Arbitration 
Rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and the 1985 Rules of the 
London Court of International Arbitration. For more detailed overview on these organisations and their rules, 
see for example Born 2014 p. 175-198. 
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was responsible for the drafting and amending of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence 
in International Commercial Arbitration.
28
 
 International Bar Association and the Rules on the Taking of Evidence 2.1.4.
As discussed in the previous chapters, the 70’s and 80’s saw a plethora of international 
arbitration rules drafted and adopted in the hopes of harmonizing and clarifying the 
dominant principles of international arbitration. However, it was noted that the majority of 
these rules, including the UNCITRAL Model Law, left the actual proceedings of the 
arbitration for the parties to decide. This raised a problem of different legal backgrounds, 
namely civil and common law, coming into conflict when deciding on procedural rules of 
an arbitration. This conflict was seen to be most severe in evidentiary procedures. To 
address the issue, Committee D of the IBA Section of Business Law formed a sub-
committee that included representatives from varying legal backgrounds to further address 
procedural problems in international arbitration. However, it was agreed upon that drafting 
a full, comprehensive set of arbitration rules would not prove a valid method to resolve 
such distinct issues, causing the sub-committee to decide to limit the discussion to only 
evidentiary matters.
29
 
As it became apparent that there were clear and meaningful differences between the 
evidence procedures in civil and common law systems, the sub-committee decided to 
address these differences by drafting a set of evidence rules on the principle of finding a 
middle ground between the systems. The rules were to emphasize the principles of party 
autonomy and wide powers of the arbitrators. This process eventually led to the adoption 
of IBA Supplementary Rules Governing the Presentation and Reception of Evidence in 
International Commercial Arbitration in 1983.
 30
 
However, despite being well received by the international legal community, the 1983 Rules 
did not gain significant popularity in the field of international arbitration and remained 
relatively unused throughout the decade and a half they retained their original form. One 
reason for this lack of use could be the unusually wide powers given to arbitrators by the 
rules, as this idea was not yet as popular in the world of arbitration as it would be a decade 
                                                 
28 Born 2014 p. 137-139 and Shenton 1985 p. 118-119. 
29 Shenton 1985 p. 118-120. 
30 Shenton 1985 p. 120-124. 
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later. Also, the civil and common law systems for evidentiary proceedings were seen as 
completely contradictory to each other. Thus, representatives of either system would have 
found it difficult to conform to amendments made towards the other system by the 1983 
IBA Rules.
31
 
By the late 90’s, the civil and common law attitudes towards evidence had begun to move 
closer to each other, providing a more accepting atmosphere towards a hybrid system of 
the two. The ongoing trend of harmonisation in international arbitration had brought forth 
new and more distinct commonly accepted practices while the whole field of international 
arbitration was rapidly growing. To address this situation, IBA once again put together a 
working group of established practitioners in the field of international arbitration from 
different legal backgrounds. This group produced the IBA Rules on the Taking of 
Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, adopted in 1999 and replacing the 
previous iteration of the rules.
32
 
The 1999 IBA Rules of Evidence retained their predecessor’s focus on party autonomy and 
wide powers of the arbitrators, as well as the goal of promoting a system that blends the 
evidentiary practices of common and civil law. One of the main focal points of the revision 
was document production: the working group especially sought to exclude the wide pre-
trial discovery of the USA and the so-called fishing expeditions it would allow, thus 
promoting arbitrator control on document production.
33
 Unlike the 1983 Rules, the new 
revised rules on evidence became both well-received and widely used in international 
arbitration, and are among the most often referenced rules in the field. This popularity 
stemmed from the well-balanced system that effectively combined the best aspects of civil 
and common law systems, as well as from the flexibility and practicality of the rules.
34
 
The 1999 Rules were not flawless, however, and thus in 2008 IBA again gave its 
Arbitration Committee the task of chartering and addressing any need for revision of the 
                                                 
31 Kreindler 2010 p. 157, Lew 1999 p. 288-289 and Paulsson 1998. 
32 Dries – Strong 2005 p. 301, Kreindler 2010 p. 157 and Raeschke-Kessler 2002 p. 411  
33 Raeschke-Kessler 2002 p. 411 and 415-416. 
34
 Griffin 2000 p. 21, Dries – Strong 2005 p. 301 and Raeschke-Kessler 2002 p. 430. The IBA Rules on 
Evidence are designed to cater to a wide variety of purposes, as they can be adopted by the parties as fully or 
partially binding, as well as used just as general guidelines on arbitration procedure. This flexibility is 
reflected in section 2 of the preamble to the IBA 2010 Rules, for more detailed information see chapter 3.1.2. 
of this thesis. This provision was also included in the 1999 version of the rules, and remained unchanged in 
the 2010 revision. 
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rules. This process eventually led to the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Arbitration
35
. This revision saw the addition of a good faith principle, as well 
as further amendments to document production procedures. In addition, one of the main 
considerations of the committee was how to address electronic disclosure of documents. 
While not as major as the changes made in the 1999 revision, the new amendments are 
nevertheless influential and important. The 2010 IBA Rules and the changes made in the 
revision are discussed in greater detail in later chapters of this thesis.
36
 
2.2. Basic Terminology of Document Production 
It should come as no surprise that when dealing in an international setting, the terminology 
of evidence varies wildly depending on the legal background of the author. In regards to 
document production, three distinct terms are in use, and often not in an entirely consistent 
manner: document production, document disclosure and discovery. It is important to note 
that to some extent this terminological differentiation reflects the conflict of legal systems 
present in international arbitration. 
Like most institutional arbitration rules, The IBA Rules use the term “document 
production.” As the IBA Rules represent a neutral compromise between different legal 
systems, the terms used should also reflect the same principle. As such, document 
production is the most neutral and broadly used of the previously mentioned terms. While 
some scholars argue that the term “document production” should only refer to adverse 
document production,
37
 most experts tend to accept a definition that also includes the 
voluntary submission of documents. This broader definition is also consistent with the IBA 
Rules.
38
 To stay in line with the IBA Rules, the broad definition has been adopted for this 
thesis. 
Discovery is traditionally a term associated with the common law evidentiary system, and 
as such can cause confusion when used in an international arbitration setting. Because of 
this the IBA Rules, as well as most other international arbitration rules, choose to avoid 
using the term “discovery.” Moreover, some scholars strongly object to its use in an 
                                                 
35 It should be noted that the 2010 revision omitted the term “commercial” from the name, to reflect the idea 
that the IBA Rules can be applied, to an extent, in investment as well as commercial arbitration. Segesser 
2010 p. 740. 
36 Kreindler 2010 p. 157-159. 
37 Schneider 2008, p. 15. 
38 O’Malley 2010 p. 186. 
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international arbitration setting
39
. However, most international arbitration evidence rules 
are not strictly limited to a civil law system, but tend to have elements from both civil law 
document production and discovery. As such, discovery has become more liberally used in 
this context, and as such is not always limited to its strict common law meaning. However, 
for the purpose of clarity in this thesis the term “discovery” is reserved for US-style 
discovery only. 
Lastly, some scholars have adopted the term “disclosure” when discussing international 
arbitration.
40
 While the term is sometimes used to distinguish English traditions from 
American style discovery
41
, and is given a specific meaning under English law causing 
some scholars to object to its use in an international arbitration context
42
, such 
terminological distinctions seem superficial and irrelevant to the underlying problems 
stemming from the differences in legal systems. 
As discussed before, all three aforementioned terms are often used quite freely when 
discussing international arbitration. However, both “discovery” and “disclosure” tend to 
refer specifically to tribunal-ordered production of documents.
43
 This is the approach 
adopted for in this thesis, while “document production” is used as a broader blanket term, 
encompassing voluntary production of documents as well. When discussing specific 
national procedures, however, the terms “discovery” and “disclosure” are used in their 
specific national legal definitions. 
2.3. Definition of Documents 
There exists no single commonly accepted definition for document in an international legal 
setting. Some legal cultures accept only tangible items, such as paper sheets, as documents 
in a valid evidentiary sense, while others have broader definitions, encompassing for 
example electronic information such as e-mails or even recorded voices. As technology has 
professed and consequently the use of electronic communication has increased in the 
recent decades, the admissibility of electronic documents has become a prominent issue in 
international arbitration. For example, electronic documents are addressed in option I of 
                                                 
39 See for example Berger 2009 p.229. 
40 See for example Born 2014 p. 2319-2321 and Lew 2003 p. 556. 
41 Born 2014 p. 2321, footnote 9. 
42 Malinvaud 2009 p. 374 and 380-381. 
43 Born 2014 p. 2321. 
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the UNCITRAL Model Law article 7. However, so far states have mainly preferred option 
II of the said article when adopting legislation based on the model law, leaving electronic 
evidence unaddressed.
44
 
It is therefore not surprising that The IBA Rules include their own definition for the term 
“document”: 
“’Document’ means a writing, communication, picture, drawing, program or data of 
any kind, whether recorded or maintained on paper or by electronic, audio, visual or 
any other means.” 
This makes it clear that the IBA Rules include electronic evidence in the scope of the 
definition.
45
 In fact, the definition is drafted to encompass most, if not all forms of 
documents that could possibly be used as evidence in arbitration. The 2010 revision of the 
rules added communication, drawing, program and data to the definition. However, this 
amendment made no marked factual changes to the wide definition of the term 
“document,” as the added forms of evidence could be interpreted to have been included in 
the earlier version of the definition.
46
 
Still, one should not read too much into rigid definitions of documents in an international 
arbitration setting. The main goal of an arbitral tribunal is, in the end, to establish the truth 
of the matter and make a decision accordingly. This means that a tribunal generally will 
accept any kind of document it deems necessary for achieving said goal, unless the 
mandatory rules governing the arbitration prevent it from doing so.
47
 It should also be 
noted that the parties are free to agree on the types of documents admissible within the 
limits imposed by the mandatory rules of the lex arbitri and party-chosen applicable 
procedural rules. 
                                                 
44 Lew 2009 p. 15-16. 
45 Electronic disclosure is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.6. 
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47 Lew 2009 p. 16. 
15 
 
2.4. Differences in Evidence Procedure between Civil and Common Law 
 General Differences between the Systems 2.4.1.
As stated before, international arbitration often involves parties, legal counsels or 
arbitrators from different legal cultures. This naturally leads to conflict between the 
different systems, as each participant tends to act and interpret procedure according to the 
system most familiar to them. Evidentiary proceedings of international arbitration are 
perhaps the most illustrative situations regarding these differences and conflicts, as the role 
and scope of discovery in international arbitration has been a constant topic of discussion 
between scholars during the last few decades. As the IBA Rules seek to offer a “best of 
both worlds” -type of approach to this conflict, it is important to illustrate the basic 
differences between common and civil law evidentiary proceedings. 
One does not need to go past the pleading stage of arbitration for the general differences 
between common and civil law evidentiary procedures to be evident. In civil law countries, 
when a party pleads a case the party is expected to present all the evidence its case relies 
on. This essentially means the evidence that is beneficial to the submitting party in the 
particular case. In addition, a party is expected to present its arguments and their 
relationship with the presented documentary evidence, i. e. which piece of evidence 
supports which argument or stated fact, and in what way.
48
 Thus, parties are not initially 
required to disclose evidence adversarial to their case. When it comes to involuntary 
document production, civil law tribunals are often reluctant to order document production, 
and when they do, they tend to limit its scope profoundly. Often a party can only request 
the opposing party to produce single documents the requesting party can specify in 
sufficient detail. The level of specifying required is often spelled out in procedural laws of 
civil law countries.
49
 Another key aspect of civil law evidence procedure is its inquisitorial 
nature: the court is expected to regulate, assess and initiate evidentiary proceedings.
50
 
When it comes to the importance of different types of evidence, civil law systems greatly 
favour written documents to oral testimonies. Therefore, oral interrogations are given less 
weight than in common law systems, as civil law judges tend to have a sceptical attitude 
                                                 
48 Lew et al. 2003 p. 237 and Smit 1996 p. 162. 
49 Berger 2009 p. 227-228 and Elsing – Townsend 2002 p. 60.  
50 Lew et al. 2003 p. 533 and Blackaby et al. 2009 p. 385. 
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towards witness statements. Consequently, in civil law systems oral testimonies are often 
considered necessary only if a party contests the authenticity of a produced document.
51
 
By contrast, common law systems place far more responsibility in the hands of the parties. 
The initial pleadings are brief and contain no documentary evidence or legal arguments.
52
 
In common law systems, the evidence gathering is conducted through what is known as 
pre-trial discovery. This means that after the initial pleading stage, parties are expected to 
request the opposing party to produce any and all documents relevant to the case at hand, 
excluding those that are covered by privilege.
53
 Common law systems often include 
multiple different legal instruments for this process
54
. Because discovery is mostly carried 
out by the parties, the role of the presiding judge is much more limited than in civil law 
systems. In what are often referred to as adversarial proceedings, judges are merely 
expected to listen to the arguments and counter-arguments of the parties and in the end 
decide which party has won.
55
 Documents are expected to be introduced with oral witness 
statements, and as such are given far less weight than the testimonies themselves, which 
are tested by an extensive process of cross-examination by the parties.
56
 The scope of 
common law discovery is significantly broader than the restrictive than its civil law 
counterpart. As an example, the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(b)(1) states: 
“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 
any party's claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature, custody, 
condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity 
and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.” 
This can be interpreted as requiring a party to produce all relevant documents, except the 
ones covered by privilege.
57
 
While these short descriptions illustrate the fundamental differences in the two systems of 
evidentiary procedure, it should be noted that there exists variety even within the systems. 
                                                 
51 Berger 2009 p. 227, Blackaby et al. 2009 p. 385, Elsing – Townsend 2002  p. 62, Lew 2009 p .15 and Smit 
1996 p. 162-163. 
52 Hancock – Reed 2009 p. 342 and Smit 1996 p. 164. 
53 Bower – Sharpe 2008 p. 304 and Gaillard – Savage 1999 p. 689. 
54 For example, in the US these mechanisms include depositions, requests for production, interrogatories and 
requests for admission. See for example Hancock – Reed 2009 p. 343-345. 
55 Blackaby et al. 2009 p. 385 and Lew et al. 2003 p. 533. 
56 Smit 1996 p. 164. 
57 Hancock – Reed 2009 p. 343. 
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In the US, the scope of discovery is at its broadest, while the corresponding system in 
England places far more limits on the scope of discovery.
58
 Similar variety is even more 
apparent in the systems of civil law countries: while the common law practices stem from 
the same historical background, the practices of continental Europe lack a common origin. 
As a result, the scope of discovery-like document disclosure in civil law countries varies 
wildly: in some jurisdictions any court-ordered document production is prohibited, while 
some allow such practices to varying degrees.
59
 However, there are enough common 
elements inside both systems to justify a comparison between the two, and to distinguish 
some clear differences in the practices.
60
 
 Unifying the Two Systems 2.4.2.
As international arbitration frequently brings the two different systems into conflict, there 
exists a need for a practice that is acceptable to parties and lawyers from differing legal 
backgrounds. It would be quite unbeneficial for a party to agree to procedures it is not 
familiar with, if the opposing party has substantial experience dealing with the chosen 
system. In addition, parties often wish to promote a swift and efficient process. This has 
led to the development of accepted common practices that draw from both the civil and 
common law procedures, aiming to combine the best of both worlds.
61
 
While some civil law lawyers vehemently object to discovery procedures, it is now 
common practice to allow some extent of discovery in an international arbitration. In fact, 
the opposition seems to be more focused on the use of the term “discovery” due to its 
association with broad US-style discovery procedures and so called fishing expeditions, 
rather than on the procedures themselves.
62
 When it comes to the initial pleading stage, the 
current accepted common practice follows the civil law model: parties are expected to 
produce the evidence their case relies on, i.e. the evidence beneficial to its case. In addition 
to the continental style of document production, it has become standard practice to also 
allow limited discovery, usually permitting a party to request that the opposing party 
produce a certain, specified document or category of documents, if the requested 
                                                 
58 Blackaby et al. 2009 p. 385. 
59 Reymond 1989 p. 358-360. 
60 Blackaby et al. 2009 p. 386. 
61 Reymond 1989 p. 367 and Smit 1996 p. 165. 
62 Elsing – Townsend 2002 p. 60-61. See also Berger 2009 p. 227-229. Berger goes as far as to state that 
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documents are considered relevant to the outcome of the case. This way, the system is both 
broader than the standard civil law practices, yet more restrictive than common law 
discovery.
63
 This is also the approach chosen in the IBA Rules, further cementing its place 
as an accepted best practice
64
. 
It should be noted that a perfect, complete marriage between the two systems is probably 
not achievable, and it would not be beneficial to strive for such system in the first place. As 
every arbitration is unique, the common accepted practice should contain enough 
procedural flexibility to allow modifying of the proceedings to fit each situation 
specifically.
65
 Hence, many of the decisions about procedure are often left to the 
arbitrators, as they are in the best position to create the best system for each individual 
situation
66
. 
2.5. Lex Arbitri and the Choice of Procedural Law 
As this thesis deals with the arbitral process, a few words about the choice of procedural 
law are in order. However, it should be noted that it is important to separate the law 
governing the arbitration, commonly referred to as lex arbitri, from both the procedural 
law of the arbitration and the applied substantive law. As this thesis concerns itself solely 
on procedural matters, the choice of substantive law is left out of this discussion. 
While the parties to arbitration have substantial freedom to choose how the arbitral 
procedure is conducted and what rules govern it, this freedom is not without outer limits. 
To a certain extent, every arbitration is subject to the national laws of some country or 
other. Most often these are the laws of the seat of the arbitration, i. e. the country where the 
arbitration takes place.
67
 Although parties agreeing to follow the national procedural 
arbitration laws of a country other than the seat of the arbitration is not unheard of, such 
conduct is extremely rare. Therefore, “lex arbitri” is often used to refer simply to the 
procedural laws of the seat of the arbitration.
68
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Lex arbitri is the starting point when determining the rules governing an international 
arbitration process. This basic principle is generally accepted in most countries and 
arbitration practices, and is also included in most international arbitration rules.
69
 For 
example, the UNCITRAL Model Law references this principle in its article 1(2): 
“The provisions of this Law, except articles 8, 9, 17 H, 17 I, 17 J, 35 and 36, apply 
only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of this State.” 
As a result of the harmonisation trend discussed in chapter 2.1.3., this territorial principle 
has been widely adopted in national arbitration laws, either through adopting the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, or simply by modelling arbitration legislation to follow common 
arbitration practice.
70
 
While lex arbitri is the underlying law governing the arbitration proceedings, it is far from 
being the only one. In fact, most national arbitration laws promote the principle of party 
autonomy and leave substantial freedom for the parties to choose how to conduct the 
arbitral process. The few mandatory rules present in national legislation mostly concern 
themselves with due process and procedural fairness.
71
 These basic requirements are also 
reflected in the UNCITRAL Model Law article 18: 
“The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case.” 
While not as direct on the matter, the same principle can also be found in the New York 
Convention article V(1)(b), which states that the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award may be refused, if: 
“The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case.” 
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These scarce albeit important mandatory principles leave the parties great freedom when it 
comes to adopting rules to govern the actual proceedings.
 72
 As stated previously, lex 
arbitri is not a synonym for the procedural law of the arbitration. Indeed, lex arbitri 
governs the mandatory rules that apply to the arbitration, while the procedural law is often 
chosen by the parties, and is not necessarily the law of the seat of the arbitration. To 
clarify,  lex arbitri sets the limits, or the lack thereof, for the parties’ choice of procedural 
law.
73
 In addition, the procedural law of the arbitration might not determine the actual 
procedures, due to most national arbitration legislation leaving the actual conduct of the 
procedure for the parties to decide.
74
 This legal framework allows supplementary rules, 
such as the IBA Rules, to be adopted and applied in international arbitration. 
It should be also noted that lex arbitri is not necessarily purely a procedural law. For 
example, the law of the seat of arbitration might include mandatory rules on the types of 
dispute not arbitrable under national legislation, or requirements for the arbitration to be 
settled in line with the public policy of the lex arbitri. These rules, if they indeed are 
mandatory, must be followed under the principle of lex arbitri, and are not entirely 
procedural.
75
 
While lex arbitri contains mandatory provisions that set the limits for party autonomy in an 
international arbitration, this does not mean that the parties do not have control over the lex 
arbitri: the parties can freely agree on where the arbitration will take place, consequently 
choosing the lex arbitri of their choice of seat. If the parties have not chosen a seat, this 
choice is often made by either the arbitral tribunal in ad hoc arbitrations, or the arbitral 
institution in institutional arbitrations. This allows the parties to select a venue that 
provides neutral and suitable legal environment for the arbitration, allowing them to opt for 
the best lex arbitri for the individual aspects of each dispute.
76
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3. The Duties and Powers of the Parties Regarding Document 
Production under the IBA Rules 
3.1. The Principle of Party Autonomy 
 Party Autonomy in International Arbitration Procedure 3.1.1.
Because parties to an arbitration possess fundamental freedom to choose how to conduct 
the arbitral proceedings, it is widely accepted that party autonomy is the prevalent source 
of procedure rules in an international arbitration.
77
 It follows that that an arbitration 
agreement will often prevail over other legal sources, such as common arbitration practice 
and the chosen arbitration rules. For example, a conflict between the arbitration agreement 
and the rules the parties have chosen to apply to the arbitration must be resolved in 
accordance to the arbitration agreement. As discussed in the previous chapter, initially 
party autonomy is limited only by the mandatory rules of the lex arbitri, which often leaves 
the parties free to agree on the procedural law of the arbitration as well as the actual 
procedure followed.
78
 The principle of party autonomy is explicitly stated in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law article 19(1): 
“Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure 
to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings.” 
However, party autonomy should be divided into two different temporal categories: party 
autonomy before the actual arbitral proceedings, in other words the freedom pertaining to 
drafting of an arbitral agreement, and party autonomy during the proceedings
79
. 
Before arbitration proceedings parties enjoy significant freedom to agree on the conduct of 
the proceedings. This freedom encompasses almost all aspects of these proceedings, from 
time limits to the procedure of admitting evidence.
80
 At this stage, party autonomy is 
limited only by the lex arbitri and the mandatory rules of the law governing the arbitral 
agreement. As stated in chapter 2.4., these generally concern the requirements of equal 
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treatment of the parties and due process and little else.
81
 However, as stated before, the 
parties often can at least indirectly choose the lex arbitri by choosing the seat of the 
arbitration. Consequently, it can be argued that party autonomy before the proceedings 
extends to the lex arbitri in general, although the parties naturally cannot amend or 
otherwise neglect the mandatory rules of the lex arbitri of the chosen seat.
82
 In addition, it 
should be noted that the parties cannot effectively impose direct effects on a third party, or 
give such powers to the chosen arbitral tribunal
83
. 
While the parties can freely amend their arbitration agreement before the commencement 
of the actual proceedings
84
, the scope of party autonomy during the proceedings is not as 
simple to define. For the arbitration to be effective, the arbitrators need to have at least 
some power over the parties. This creates an issue of the source of said power: whether the 
power stems from the agreement between the parties or inherently from the position of the 
arbitrators.
85
 In other words, it is unclear whether the arbitrators are in a contractual 
relationship with the parties or not, the latter case causing the power of the arbitrators to be 
inherent to their position. Of course, this relates to the question if the parties have power 
over the tribunal during the proceedings, i. e. can they, by mutual agreement, control how 
the tribunal should act even when the process has already commenced. It would seem to be 
generally accepted that the parties can, at least in a limited capacity, agree on the followed 
procedure even during the proceedings.
86
 This particular issue was debated during the 
drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law, and in the end it was decided that parties should 
be able to agree on procedures even during the arbitration
87
. 
However, party autonomy during the process is ultimately limited: the parties cannot force 
the arbitrators to concede to procedures they disagree with, as the arbitrators always have 
the power to resign in such situations.
88
 It could then be said that initially parties have the 
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ultimate authority, which then gradually moves to the arbitrators as the process advances
89
. 
This allows parties to agree on any procedural points not already addressed in the 
arbitration agreement without consulting the arbitral tribunal, even during the actual 
process. However, should the parties wish to amend an existing agreement on a procedural 
point during the arbitral process, they require consent of the tribunal.
90
  
 Party Autonomy in the IBA Rules 3.1.2.
Section 2 of the preamble to the IBA Rules states: 
“Parties and Arbitral Tribunals may adopt the IBA Rules of Evidence, in whole or in 
part, to govern arbitration proceedings, or they may vary them or use them as 
guidelines in developing their own procedures. The Rules are not intended to limit 
the flexibility that is inherent in, and an advantage of, international arbitration, and 
Parties and Arbitral Tribunals are free to adapt them to the particular circumstances 
of each arbitration.” 
It is clear that the IBA Rules do not inherently impose any limits on party autonomy. 
Consequently, parties are completely free to use the IBA Rules as they see fit, from simply 
using them as guidelines when necessary to adopting them as binding. Parties can also 
change or omit parts of the rules, if they so desire. While adopting the rules as binding is 
certainly not unheard of, most practitioners prefer the guideline approach to the IBA Rules. 
This stems from the fact that the rules are not designed as comprehensive or all-
encompassing, but instead leave a lot of procedural details for the parties to agree on by 
themselves.
91
 It follows that the IBA Rules do not constitute any additional limits on party 
autonomy when it comes to evidence. In fact, the IBA Rules themselves are subject to the 
limits discussed in the previous chapter. For example, if parties have chosen to apply the 
UNCITRAL Model Law to their arbitration, and then additionally agree on adopting the 
IBA Rules for the evidence procedure, the limits on party autonomy imposed by the 
UNCITRAL Rules apply to the procedure as a whole. In fact, the principle of the IBA 
Rules being subservient to any mandatory provisions governing an arbitration is explicitly 
stated in article 1.1 of the IBA Rules: 
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“Whenever the Parties have agreed or the Arbitral Tribunal has determined to apply 
the IBA Rules of Evidence, the Rules shall govern the taking of evidence, except to 
the extent that any specific provision of them may be found to be in conflict with any 
mandatory provision of law determined to be applicable to the case by the Parties or 
by the Arbitral Tribunal.” 
However, the order of privilege is not as clear when the IBA Rules are in conflict with 
other non-mandatory rules the parties have agreed to apply. Party autonomy provides the 
parties with the freedom to apply any set of rules, and consequently allows for these kinds 
of conflicts to arise. If the parties cannot resolve the conflict by agreement, the arbitral 
tribunal must choose the prevailing rules. The general principle is that the more detailed 
rules, often the IBA Rules in these situations, should be deemed as the primary ones.
92
 In 
its commentary, the IBA Rules of Evidence Review Subcommittee states that in the event 
of aforementioned conflict, the tribunal should attempt to harmonise the conflicting rules if 
possible
93
. 
It should also be noted that according to article 1.2, if the parties have agreed to apply the 
IBA Rules, this is to be interpreted to mean the most recent version of the rules, unless 
expressly otherwise stated by the parties. This rule was not present in the 1999 version of 
the rules, but its addition is hardly revolutionary: parties can still perfectly well agree to 
apply the earlier version of the rules if they so wish.
94
 
3.2. The Duty to Act in Good Faith 
So far, one of the most controversial additions of the revised IBA Rules has been the 
addition of the duty of good faith, spelled out in paragraph 3 of the preamble to the IBA 
Rules: 
 “The taking of evidence shall be conducted on the principles that each Party shall 
act in good faith.” 
Even before the 2010 revision of the rules, there existed discussion on whether the IBA 
Rules should include a requirement to act in good faith. Such a duty could certainly be 
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seen as being one of the basic premises of almost any legal system, as it enforces the aim 
of settling a dispute according to the objective truth of the matter, and discourages the 
procuring of favourable awards by dishonest or fraudulent means. However, the scope of 
the duty of good faith is difficult to determine, as there exists no agreed international 
practice on the matter. If left too broad, the duty to act in good faith could considerably 
broaden the scope of document production, consequently raising the cost and length of 
arbitral proceedings.
95
 
The provision added to the IBA Rules leaves open what type of conduct constitutes a 
breach of the duty to act in good faith. In fact, the approach chosen in the rules is to give 
no definition for the duty to act in good faith, or indicate any particular interpretation for it. 
This could leave parties uncertain of what actions they are allowed to take, or what type of 
conduct is seen as “bad faith,” especially since the new IBA Rules include, in article 9.7, 
the possibility to take breaches of the duty to act in good faith into account when the 
tribunal considers cost allocation.
96
 It is also noteworthy that article 9.7 is not limited to the 
allocation of the costs of evidence procedure, but also seemingly refers to the total costs of 
the arbitration process
97
. 
The duty to act in good faith is not necessarily a novel obligation in international 
arbitration. In fact, it could be argued that the new preamble to the IBA Rules simply spells 
out a commonly understood practice, a duty that has already been assumed to be part of 
international arbitral proceedings. Indeed, some authors take this view, because arbitration 
itself requires a mutual consensus of the parties, and as such could be interpreted to also 
implicitly include a mutual duty to co-operate and work together towards a resolution.
98
 
Additionally, it could be argued that the arbitration agreement itself inherently implies the 
existence of a duty to act in good faith, as the performance of the agreement can be said to 
require co-operation in good faith
99
. Whether or not this is the case, the addition of good 
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faith into the IBA Rules has drawn more attention to the obligation and its implications, 
and will likely continue to do so in the future
100
. 
The scope of the duty to act in good faith is far from being universally defined and 
accepted. In fact, considerable variation exists even between states sharing the same legal 
background, and the duty might be interpreted to mean different things in different types of 
disputes. For example, US legislation alone has several different meanings for the duty to 
act in good faith.
101
 Because the IBA Rules do not provide any direction on the matter of 
defining the duty, it then falls to the parties and the arbitrators to define the duty in 
accordance with the specific attributes of their particular dispute
102
. In conjunction with the 
cost allocation powers given to the arbitral tribunal in article 9.7, the lack of definition 
could be seen as expanding the inherent authority of the tribunal and consequently limiting 
party autonomy in an unpredictable way.
103
 For example, it could be argued that even 
when parties have explicitly agreed to allocate arbitral costs evenly, article 9.7 of the IBA 
Rules could give an arbitral tribunal the power to allocate costs to one party due to a 
breach of the duty to act in good faith, despite the agreement. 
However, the opposite could also be true. If the duty to act in good faith is seen as an 
inherent obligation of an arbitral process, it then follows that the parties assume each other 
to conduct themselves accordingly. In other words, the duty to act in good faith can be seen 
as an underlying criterion for the arbitral agreement, meaning that all aspects of the 
agreement are expected to be conducted in good faith by both parties. Consequently, the 
tribunal’s power to allocate costs to a party acting in bad faith can be argued not to limit 
party autonomy, as the parties could explicitly agree to share costs equally even in the case 
that one party does not act in good faith. Thus it could even be claimed that a rigid, 
limiting definition of good faith in the IBA Rules could severely limit the flexibility of an 
arbitration conducted under the said rules. Additionally, choosing a definite interpretation 
of good faith could be detrimental to the goal of providing a framework of evidence 
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procedure equally accessible and fair to parties and arbitrators from different legal 
cultures.
104
 
As the duty to act in good faith would be extremely difficult to define in a way that would 
be universally accepted, there appear to be few options for including a definition in the 
IBA Rules. One proposed option would be to define good faith through the principle of 
transparency, a principle often accepted as being part of international arbitration 
proceedings.
105
 However, defining good faith through another theoretical principle with 
multiple possible definitions seems somewhat redundant, when the lack of definition can 
be justified by interpreting the duty to act in good faith to be an inherent part of the 
arbitration process. In addition, party autonomy allows for the parties to agree on the 
definition and scope of good faith as they please when adopting the IBA Rules, which is in 
accordance to the stated aim of the rules to provide a flexible system applicable to different 
types of disputes. However, it should be noted that parties should indeed discuss the duty 
to act in good faith in their initial contract negotiations or at least before the proceedings. 
Since the duty to act in good faith permeates the IBA Rules as a whole, the particular 
problems arising from the inclusion of the principle and its relations to the other provisions 
of the rules are further discussed throughout this thesis whenever appropriate. 
3.3. Voluntary Production of Documents 
As stated in Chapter 2.4.2, the IBA Rules have adopted the civil law system for the initial 
voluntary production of documents. This means that parties are expected to produce the 
documents their case relies on before the actual proceedings. Due process requires the 
documents to be submitted to both the tribunal and the other parties, as this allows the 
parties to react to the evidence presented by the opposing party, and possibly submit 
counter-evidence before the actual hearing.
106
 This is explicitly stated in article 3.1 of the 
IBA Rules: 
“…each Party shall submit to the Arbitral Tribunal and to the other Parties all 
Documents available to it on which it relies, including public Documents and those 
in the public domain.” 
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While this rule might seem relatively simple from the outset, it becomes somewhat more 
problematic when viewed together with the requirement for the parties to act in good faith. 
This raises the question whether a party should voluntarily produce all relevant documents, 
even those adversarial to its case. Moreover, should a party produce only beneficial 
documents while in the possession of documents adversarial to its case, can said party be 
interpreted to be breaching its duty to act in good faith? On the other hand, the IBA Rules 
include a mechanism, albeit a limited one, to request the opposing party to produce 
documents in its possession. Could this mechanism be seen to be a sufficient way to 
produce adversarial documents, without the need to consider whether a party has acted in 
good faith before these requests are submitted, or whether requests to produce exists in 
order to bring the possible breaches of good faith into light.
107
 
Let us look at the underlying question: does the requirement to act in good faith, in the 
context of the IBA Rules, inherently include the obligation for a party to produce all 
relevant documents, even those deemed adversarial to its case, or helpful to the opposing 
party? Veeder seems to imply as much, basing his argument on the notion that dishonesty, 
fraud or hiding relevant documents should not be able to lead to a favourable award. 
However, Veeder posits that the general difficulty in defining the duty to act in good faith 
as well as its scope could lead to a considerably heavier burden of document disclosure, 
resulting in higher costs and longer processes.
108
 However, the duty to act in good faith 
could also be interpreted to only apply within the scope provided by the provisions of the 
IBA Rules. In this case, the duty would not expand the scope of document production, but 
instead merely enforce it and ensure the honesty of a document production process 
conducted under the IBA Rules. Priority, then, should be given to the wording of the 
articles of the rules. In the case of article 3.1, it would then follow that the parties have no 
obligation to voluntarily produce all relevant material, including the documents adversary 
to their case, as article 3.1 only calls for the production of the documents a party intends to 
rely on.
109
 
As article 3.1 also requires the parties to produce public documents, not producing such 
documents in the hopes that the other party does not notice their existence could be 
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interpreted as constituting a breach of the duty to act in good faith. However, a party would 
rarely have reason to rely on any public documents adverse to its case. It could certainly be 
argued that not producing adverse public documents does not exactly constitute hiding said 
documents, as the opposing party can freely read and produce public documents as 
documents it intends to rely on. It then would follow that if a party fails to notice any 
public documents beneficial to its case, it should not be the duty of the opposing party to 
point out these documents to the opposition. 
As the IBA Rules, for better or for worse, now include an undefined obligation to act in 
good faith, the latter interpretation seems more practical and sensible. Article 3.1 only 
speaks of documents a party plans to rely on; an obligation to produce all relevant 
documents would needlessly broaden the scope stated in the article. After all, parties rarely 
tend to rely on documents that would harm their own case. In addition, a duty to produce 
all relevant documents would possibly lengthen the arbitral process, as well as raise the 
already substantial costs of document production. This would contradict the aim of 
conducting the process efficiently and economically, a goal stated numerous times in the 
IBA Rules
110
. Naturally, the parties can agree on a broad obligation to produce documents 
if they so please. In any case, it is recommended that parties at least discuss the scope of 
the duty to act in good faith to avoid any unforeseen consequences. 
If the duty to act in good faith is interpreted to not include a broader obligation of 
document production than what is stated in article 3.1, how, if at all, would the duty then 
apply to the said article? Kläsener suggests that, for example, a failure to produce the 
documents a party intends to rely on in order to produce them later, with the intent to 
surprise either witnesses or the other party, or otherwise deny the opposition the chance to 
properly react to those documents, could constitute a breach of the duty to act in good 
faith. This would be especially clear in the light of paragraph 3 of the preamble, which in 
addition to the duty to act in good faith states that parties have the right to know in advance 
of any evidence the opposing party plans to rely on.
111
 Other examples of breaching the 
duty to act in good faith could include, among others, producing falsified documents or 
documents that have been altered to appear to support the case of the producing party. This 
seems like a sensible scope for good faith concerning voluntary document production 
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under article 3.1 of the IBA Rules, as it does not require extensive and expensive measures 
while still ensuring the honesty and fairness of the process to a sufficient extent. 
Additionally, the arbitral tribunal can prevent these kinds of “surprise” tactics by initially 
stating that the parties are prohibited to produce more documentary evidence they intend to 
rely on after the initial production phase, unless the tribunal specifically allows it
112
. 
Finally, it should be noted that article 3.11 of the IBA Rules includes a possibility for the 
tribunal to set a timeframe during which the parties can produce any additional documents 
they wish to rely on, if the parties believe said documents to have become relevant to the 
dispute. This provision serves to allow more flexibility, as a rigid requirement to produce 
all relevant documents at the onset of the dispute would not fit comfortably in disputes that 
evolve during the proceedings. However, the arbitral tribunal should take care when 
allowing later production of documents, as it can allow for the parties to withhold evidence 
in the hopes of submitting it later as newly relevant. For this reason, the arbitral tribunal 
should carefully consider whether any new issues or other matters requiring new evidence 
have emerged before allowing later submissions of documents. 
3.4. Requesting the Production of Documents 
 Article 3.3 of the IBA Rules 3.4.1.
A request to produce provides a way for a party to gain access to documents it believes to 
be in the possession of the opposing party, when the party assumes these documents could 
be beneficial to its own case. In order to do so, pursuant to article 3.2 of the IBA Rules, a 
party must submit this request to the arbitral tribunal and the other party or parties. The 
other party is then given a chance to either voluntarily comply with the submitted request 
or contest it. If a party fails to produce the requested documents, provided that there are no 
valid grounds to deny the request, the arbitral tribunal has the power to compel the 
production of documents by a procedural order.
113
 It should be noted that the 1999 version 
of the IBA Rules defined request to produce as a request for a procedural order from the 
tribunal, but the 2010 revision changed the definition to a written request to the other party. 
Essentially, this means that the arbitral tribunal need not take part in document disclosure, 
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unless a party objects to a request, refuses to produce the requested documents or the 
tribunal specifically chooses to get involved.
114
  
Article 3.3 of the IBA Rules states: 
“A Request to Produce shall contain: 
(a) (i) a description of each requested Document sufficient to identify it, or 
(ii) a description in sufficient detail (including subject matter) of a narrow and 
specific requested category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist; in 
the case of Documents maintained in electronic form, the requesting Party may, or 
the Arbitral Tribunal may order that it shall be required to, identify specific files, 
search terms, individuals or other means of searching for such Documents in an 
efficient and economical manner; 
(b) a statement as to how the Documents requested are relevant to the case and 
material to its outcome; and 
(c) (i) a statement that the Documents requested are not in the possession, custody or 
control of the requesting Party or a statement of the reasons why it would be 
unreasonably burdensome for the requesting Party to produce such Documents, and 
(ii) a statement of the reasons why the requesting Party assumes the Documents 
requested are in the possession, custody or control of another Party.” 
It is important to note that the IBA Rules allow both a request for a single specific 
document, as well as a category of documents. There is very little to say about a request for 
a specific document, as the article is fairly clear on the matter and hardly allows for widely 
varying interpretations. In fact, article 3.3(a)(i) is in line with similar rules used in many 
civil law countries, including the procedural law of Finland.
115
 Firstly, the request for a 
specific document should include, unless the parties agree otherwise, the assumed author 
or addressee of the document, or both in an ideal situation. Secondly, the requesting party 
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should define either a date or at least a presumed time period within which the document 
was created. Lastly, the request should have a description of the contents of the requested 
document, or at least a description of what the requesting party has reason to believe the 
document to contain.
116
  
The production of a document category and its scope are considerably more open to 
discussion than the production request for a single document. The possibility to request a 
production of a document category is a clear indication of the nature of the IBA Rules as a 
middle ground between the civil and common law systems. As already discussed in chapter 
2.4., Civil law systems generally have an adverse reaction to ordering a party to produce 
documents unbeneficial to its case, consequently opting for a very limited production of 
specific, single documents. For example, this is the approach taken in Finnish national 
legislation. However, common law systems generally promote the right of a party to have 
access to all relevant documents, thus allowing broader requests to produce documents or 
categories of documents. At its broadest, in the U.S., this right to discovery can allow a 
party to submit relatively undefined requests for broad categories of documents in the 
hopes that they will come upon something useful while searching through the produced 
documents.
117
 
The approach taken in the IBA Rules is to strictly exclude the U.S. style discovery 
procedure and especially the so-called fishing expeditions described in the previous 
paragraph. However, the IBA Rules choose also not to follow the strict regimen for 
requesting document production imposed in civil law systems. Instead, the Rules allow for 
limited discovery style requests.
118
 This premise can also be interpreted to not give the 
arbitral tribunal the power to allow a party to search through documents in the possession 
of the opposing party
119
. 
Article 3.4 of the 1999 IBA Rules stated that the requested documents should be produced 
to both the arbitral tribunal and the other party or parties. This provision was a continuation 
of the previously stated goal of prohibiting “fishing expeditions,” as this made it 
impossible for the requesting party to go through the requested documents and essentially 
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choose which documents to submit, before the tribunal had had a chance to see the 
documents. This could be seen as prohibiting a party the to “fish” for documents unrelated 
to the case at hand, but that might somehow be beneficial to it in other ways outside the 
arbitration.
120
 The rule also had an economic purpose, as the parties were expected to limit 
their own requests so as not to burden the tribunal and consequently lengthen the process 
and raise its costs
121
. Interestingly, the revised IBA Rules require the documents to be 
produced to the tribunal only if the tribunal specifically orders it. It was deemed inefficient 
for the arbitral tribunal to be compelled to review all the documents when produced, thus 
making the process more burdensome than necessary.
122
 However, this change seems to 
open a way for the parties to conduct the kind of limited “fishing expeditions” described 
earlier. It then follows that parties are free to not rely on or submit to record the requested 
documents produced by the other party. Additionally, the possible limiting effect on the 
scope of the requests made by the parties is lost. However, while the documents are no 
longer required to be produced to the tribunal, the scope of the requests is still limited by 
the provisions of article 3.3 and the valid objections to the request available to a party. 
These are discussed in the following chapters. 
 Narrow and Specific Category of Documents 3.4.2.
The basic premises of interpreting what constitutes a narrow and specific category of 
documents are the same as with single documents. These three main criteria were 
described in the previous chapter. However, when considering the description given in a 
request to produce, one should not rigorously rely on the aforementioned criteria. While 
including all of the mentioned descriptions in the request certainly provides the tribunal 
and the other party or parties the best grounds for assessing the request, all three are not 
always required for the requested category of documents to be interpreted to be described 
in sufficient detail. For example, in some cases descriptions of the source and recipients of 
the documents might be enough to describe the category, without the need to require a 
description of a time period of the creation of the documents.
123
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However, the requested documents should, by default, be tied to a common topic. This 
means that the requested category should be requested in order to prove a specific point, 
instead of requesting a broad category of documents under the guise that they have a 
general relationship with the case at hand. It then follows that the request should always 
include a description of the presumed contents of the documents, which allows the tribunal 
and the opposing party to properly evaluate the request and its validity.
124
 
As an example of a narrow and specific category of documents, the IBA Working Party 
refers to joint venture termination notices. In these cases, the requesting party is, or at least 
should be, privy to the date of the notice and who, in these cases often the board of the 
other party, made the decision concerning the termination. The requesting party, then, also 
knows that there must be preliminary documents on the board meeting, as well as notes 
and minutes made of the meeting itself. In addition, the requesting party can infer that the 
meeting must have taken place shortly before the giving of the notice. This information 
provides the requesting party enough material to describe the documents relating to the 
meeting in sufficient detail, despite the requesting party not knowing the exact time or 
authors of the requested documents. Consequently, this request could easily qualify as a 
narrow and specific category under the IBA Rules.
125
 
However, the former example is a relatively simple one, and there is little to debate about 
its validity. More problematic examples are the board protocols cited by the IBA Working 
Party as narrow and specific category of documents. If a party knows a relevant topic has 
been discussed in board meetings, it could then under the IBA Rules request the board 
meeting transcripts as evidence.
126
 However, if the requesting party sufficiently knows the 
timeframe, topic and authors of the transcripts, is there really a need to request them as a 
category of documents? The requesting party could just as well request the transcripts as 
specific documents under the IBA Rules article 3.3(a)(i), without the need to apply the 
harder to interpret rules of requesting a category of documents.
127
 
Nevertheless, the former example is still a fairly simple matter, as the request for board 
transcripts would still most likely be sufficient to compel the production of the requested 
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documents, regardless of if they are requested as single documents or a category. 
Conceivably, a party could request all correspondence between the opposing party and a 
distinct third party, concerning a specified topic. It is unclear whether or not this kind of 
request should be allowed under the IBA Rules. In this case, it becomes difficult to make a 
distinction between the required specificity of the request and the interpretation of narrow 
and distinct: while the aforementioned request could certainly include all the required 
criteria for a specific request, the requested category itself could be seen as too broad to be 
allowed. Consequently, this could lead to the parties disagreeing to how article 3.3 should 
be interpreted, which would complicate the proceedings.
128
 Naturally, this problem could 
be resolved by the parties agreeing to follow a specific interpretation. However, in reality 
the parties rarely have the time, money or interest to discuss and agree on the interpretation 
of every single article of the rules they have agreed to follow. As the IBA Rules 
themselves are designed to make the initial negotiations easier and more economic by 
providing a rule set that follows the best practices of international arbitration, parties might 
be inclined to agree to follow the IBA Rules without much consideration for their 
interpretation. Therefore, parties should make sure that that they are in agreement about the 
interpretation of article 3.3 prior to the arbitration process. 
If the parties have not agreed on the interpretation of a narrow and specific category of 
documents, the task of limiting the scope of category requests falls on the tribunal. But as 
the previous chapter shows, the interpretation is far from clear. Naturally, the IBA Rules 
should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. However, some common grounds for the 
interpretation have been suggested.
129
 First, it is important to consider the legal background 
of the parties. If the parties share a legal system, for example when both parties are from a 
common law country, the interpretation should naturally be more inclined towards the 
system both parties are familiar with. In the case of a shared common law background, it 
would then be logical to allow requests for broad categories of documents, while parties 
from similar civil law systems would be more familiar with considerably narrower 
document disclosure. This general rule, however, should not be followed too strictly: 
sometimes in an international setting it can be in the interest of parties from a common law 
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background to limit discovery, or vice versa when the parties are from civil law systems
130
. 
Secondly, the nature of the case in hand should be taken into account when interpreting the 
scope of document production. For example, if the resolution of the case is heavily 
dependent on documentary evidence, it would seem logical to allow broad requests to 
produce. Conversely, if the case relies more on legal argumentation than documentary 
evidence, a more limited document production procedure could be sufficient. Thirdly, the 
interpretation can also be affected by the financial interest of the dispute. For example, if 
the interest of the parties is relatively small, it would not be sensible to allow large-scale, 
expensive discovery procedures, while in a high-stakes case more substantial requests to 
produce would be justified.
131
 Lastly, the importance of the requested documents plays a 
role in the interpretation. If the arbitral tribunal considers the requested category of 
documents to be crucial to the resolution of the case, it then naturally follows that such 
request should be allowed
132
. 
Finally, a request to produce a category of documents could be allowed to be used as a sort 
of precaution for situations where a party intends to withhold documentary evidence. A 
party might seek to stall producing certain documents in order to surprise the other party or 
a witness with the documents later in the process. In these cases, a broad request for any 
withhold documents intended for later use in the arbitration could be allowed.
133
 However, 
such a request can easily become very vague and broad, and thus it can be dangerous to 
allow them too readily. It is worth noting that the IBA Rules already impose on the parties 
the duty to produce all material they intend to rely on before the proceedings. This, in 
conjunction with the duty to act in good faith, should sufficiently discourage parties to 
withhold documentary evidence, as a later “surprise” production can easily be interpreted 
to be a breach of the duty to act in good faith, and indeed even should be interpreted as 
such under the 2010 IBA Rules. 
 Relevance and Materiality 3.4.3.
In its request to produce, the requesting party must include a description of how the 
requested documents are relevant to the case and material to its outcome. In other words, 
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the requested documents must support either the assertions made by the requesting party, 
or provide evidence for invalidating claims made by the opposing party. This description is 
required to allow the tribunal to properly assess if the requested documents are indeed 
necessary to reach a just conclusion of the case at hand. The allegations the requesting 
party seeks to support or refute by the requested documents can be either substantial or 
procedural.
134
 
While the two terms, “relevance” and “materiality”, seem decidedly similar to one another, 
in the context of the IBA Rules they are distinct from one another. Relevance is tied to the 
allegations made by the requesting party, while materiality is linked with the case as a 
whole. Subsequently, both requirements must be met in order for a request to produce to be 
allowed. For example, if the requested documents are indeed relevant to the claims sought 
to prove with the requested documents, but the documents are on the whole immaterial to 
the final outcome of the case, the request should be denied. Same applies to situations 
where a party seeks to acquire documents that support claims already sufficiently proven 
by other evidence submitted by the parties.
135
 However, it has been suggested that if the 
requested documents are material to the case on the whole, yet support a seemingly weak 
argument, they should still be ordered to be produced
136
. It is easy agree with the latter 
point, as the failure of a party to make strong claims should not impede the production of 
documents the tribunal deems as important to determine the outcome of the arbitration. 
It is important to note that the 1999 IBA Rules only stated that the requested documents 
needed to be relevant and material to the outcome of the case, while the 2010 revision 
added the distinction between the two terms. This was done to emphasise the difference 
between the two requirements, and to make it clear that both must be met for the request to 
be allowed.
137
 It is hard to say whether or not this minor change will have any real effect 
on the proceedings. However, the amendment has made it clearer that a two-part test of 
relevance and materiality is required before a request can be allowed. This should, at least 
in theory, improve the efficiency of document production while further weeding out 
unnecessary document disclosure requests, as the two-pronged test of relevance and 
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materiality imposes more limits on requests to produce than the wording present in the 
1999 Rules. 
 Possession, Custody and Control 3.4.4.
Generally, a request to produce documents already possessed by the requesting party 
would be redundant. However, there might be tactical benefits to harassing the opposing 
party with such document production requests: for example, requesting documents already 
in the possession of the requesting party could allow said party to gain knowledge on what 
documents the opposing party possesses. To prohibit such questionable tactics, and to 
enforce economical and swift proceedings, the IBA Rules require the requesting party to 
state that the requested documents are not in its possession, custody or control. In addition, 
the requesting party must also state why it assumes the opposing party to have possession, 
custody or control of the requested documents. In rare cases the documents can already be 
available to the requesting party, but the party then must give a reason why the production 
of the documents would be unreasonably difficult for the requesting party. If a party 
possesses a copy of a document, it must present said copy as evidence, and can request for 
the production of the original only if it has reason to believe the copy to be forged or 
otherwise differ from the original document.
138
 However, even then the tribunal should be 
careful in allowing requests: if the requesting party seeks to obtain the original document 
on the grounds to see if there are any additional annotations that are not present in the 
copy, the request should only be allowed if the is reason to believe such annotations have 
truly been made. Otherwise these kinds of requests can easily be interpreted as “fishing 
expeditions.”139 
The IBA Rules do not expand on what they mean with “possession, custody or control.” It 
then falls to the tribunal to assess what can reasonably be expected from the party the 
request is aimed at. Naturally, the arbitration agreement may serve as a starting point in 
determining the scope of the duty to produce requested documents. This effectively means 
that a party can be ordered to produce documents in custody of another company or entity, 
if it belongs to the scope of the arbitration agreement. For example, a party could be 
ordered to produce documents that are in possession of its subsidiary, or another company 
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that is a part of a group defined in the arbitration agreement.
140
 The assessment should be 
practical: the more the party has control over whoever is in possession of the requested 
documents, the easier it is to allow the request. If the relationship is reversed, i. e. the 
possessing enterprise has control over the party, the situation is less clear. However, in 
such situations the controlling entity rarely has reason to deny access to the requested 
documents. In general, a tribunal should expect a party to make at least a reasonable effort 
to obtain requested documents that are not directly in its possession.
141
 
It should also be noted that pursuant to article 3.9 of the IBA Rules the parties have a right 
to request production of documents in possession of third parties. Naturally, the means of 
enforcing such a request are limited by the lex arbitri and other laws applied to the 
arbitration.
142
 However, it is important to note that the third party should have the same 
power to object to a request to produce as any party of the arbitration
143
. Requesting third 
parties to produce documents is discussed further in chapter 4.2.3. 
 Time of Submitting a Request to Produce 3.4.5.
It is not always clear when a request to produce should be submitted. Parties may often 
seek early document disclosure, but might also attempt to postpone disclosure in the hopes 
of limiting it or otherwise weakening its intended effect. Generally, early disclosure might 
not be sensible as the parties have yet to form a proper assessment of the dispute and the 
evidence they need. On the other hand, late disclosure could lead to the pool of evidence 
available to the parties and the tribunal to be incomplete or insufficient. For this reason, 
tribunals tend to favour document disclosure at the earliest possible time, in order to form a 
complete picture of the dispute as early as possible.
144
 
According to the IBA Rules, the arbitral tribunal sets the timeframe during which the 
parties are allowed to submit requests to produce to the other party. Naturally, the timing 
can also be determined by agreement between the parties. However, the IBA Rules have no 
provisions on the earliest time a request could be submitted. Logically, it would make little 
sense to allow requests to produce to be submitted prior or simultaneously to the voluntary 
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production phase, as the parties do not yet have knowledge on which documents the 
opposition plans to rely on. This approach is taken, for example, in the ICC Arbitration 
Rules article 4, section 3. According to article 5 section 1, The ICC Rules also do not allow 
for requests to produce to be submitted with answers to initial claims. This approach is in 
line with the civil law nature of the initial exchange of documents present in the IBA 
Rules. It then follows that the earliest natural time for submitting requests to produce 
should be after the initial correspondence phase, since by then the parties should already 
possess a near-complete picture on what issues are relevant, what evidence the opposition 
intends to rely on and what documents should be requested.
145
 
Finally, parties may wish to submit supplemental requests to produce when new issues or 
evidence arise during the proceedings. In general, arbitral tribunals should have no 
objections to allowing these requests when they are deemed necessary or helpful to the 
dispute in whole. However, the tribunal should also take care to make sure such requests 
are sensible in the light of new issues, arguments or evidence presented in the case.
146
 The 
IBA Rules do not include specific rules on supplementary requests, but there exists no 
reason to force parties to refrain from requesting further document production as the 
dispute evolves. In fact, allowing document production whenever the dispute requires it 
would very much be in line with the flexibility emphasised by the IBA Rules. 
 Good Faith in Submitting Requests 3.4.6.
As already discussed in chapter 3.2., the IBA Rules now include a broad duty to act in 
good faith. Therefore, the duty naturally extends to submitting requests to produce. Thus, 
we must again consider what might constitute an act in bad faith when requesting the 
production of documents. 
It would certainly be far too severe to consider every groundless request to be a breach of 
the duty to act in good faith; parties should not be expected to always make only perfectly 
valid requests. Indeed, this is the fundamental reason why the IBA Rules include a 
possibility to object to a request
147
. However, there is a line, albeit an unclear one, beyond 
which a request must be considered an act in bad faith. For example, a party may submit 
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intentionally burdensome or irrelevant requests, hoping to delay the process or otherwise 
negatively affect it or the other party. Such conduct could easily be interpreted as 
breaching the duty to act in good faith.
148
 Consequently, the line between intentional and 
unintentional baseless requests could be seen as the dividing principle between acting in 
good faith and breaching the duty. In practice, determining whether or not a party has acted 
intentionally can be exceedingly difficult. Thus, the arbitral tribunal should take great care 
when assessing the conduct of a party, and the parties should venture to be as sure as 
possible that their requests follow the requirements of article 3.3 of the IBA Rules. All in 
all, the requirement of good faith seems a competent way to prevent parties from 
embarking on wild “fishing expeditions,” as it allows the tribunal more power to manage 
the scope of document production and weed out inconsequential requests to produce. 
3.5. Objecting to a Request to Produce 
 General Objections 3.5.1.
The IBA Rules article 3.5 provides the parties a way to contest issued requests to produce: 
“If the Party to whom the Request to Produce is addressed has an objection to some 
or all of the Documents requested, it shall state the objection in writing to the 
Arbitral Tribunal and the other Parties within the time ordered by the Arbitral 
Tribunal. The reasons for such objection shall be any of those set forth in Article 9.2 
or a failure to satisfy any of the requirements of Article 3.3.” 
This power is given to the parties as a way to both further limit and define the per se broad 
powers to demand document production. As such, the power to object to requests to 
produce also serves to discourage fishing expeditions by the opposing party.
149
 As a 
general rule, the IBA Rules give a party the right to object to a request to produce on the 
grounds that the request does not meet the requirements set out in article 3.3. Therefore, a 
party can contest the materiality or relevance of the requested evidence as well as claim 
that the request is not specific enough to properly identify the requested document. When it 
comes to requested categories of evidence, a party can claim the request to be too broad or 
undefined to be allowed. Finally, a party can claim that the requested documents are not in 
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its possession, custody or control.
 150
 It should be noted that if the requesting party has 
provided sufficient proof that the requested documents are indeed in the possession, 
custody or control of the other party, adequate proof of the contrary must be provided to 
support the objection. If the requested party fails to do so, the arbitral tribunal can draw 
adverse inference.
151
 The limits of these criteria are discussed in chapter 3.4, and thus need 
not be repeated here. It should be noted that the only addition to article 3.5 made in the 
2010 revision was the reference to article 3.3, in order to clarify the principles already 
present in the previous iteration of the rules. However, this minor addition seems to have 
no real impact on the actual proceedings. 
Article 9.2 expands on the aforementioned general objections, adding a few other 
possibilities for a party to reject a request to produce. The reasons for objection in article 
9.2 are: 
“(a) lack of sufficient relevance to the case or materiality to its outcome; 
(b) legal impediment or privilege under the legal or ethical rules determined by the 
Arbitral Tribunal to be applicable; 
(c) unreasonable burden to produce the requested evidence; 
(d) loss or destruction of the Document that has been shown with reasonable 
likelihood to have occurred; 
(e) grounds of commercial or technical confidentiality that the Arbitral Tribunal 
determines to be compelling; 
(f) grounds of special political or institutional sensitivity (including evidence that has 
been classified as secret by a government or a public international institution) that 
the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be compelling; or 
(g) considerations of procedural economy, proportionality, fairness or equality of the 
Parties that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be compelling.” 
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While relevance and materiality are already discussed in previous chapters, it is important 
to take a closer look at the other objections listed above. 
 Unreasonable Burden to Produce Requested Documents 3.5.2.
As the IBA Rules offer no specifics on how to assess if a request to produce is too 
burdensome, the objection on grounds of unreasonable burden should be interpreted 
according to the practices generally accepted in international arbitration. Therefore, the 
burden of document production should be assessed in light of the other requirements set for 
the requested documents
152
. For example, the burden of producing the requested 
documents should be contrasted with the assumed relevance and materiality of the 
documents in question. While it is clear that irrelevant evidence should not be ordered to 
be produced in any case, it is far more difficult to assess when the burden and costs of 
producing certain documents outweigh their importance to the arbitration. Making such 
assessments is further complicated by the fact that the tribunal often has not had the chance 
to review the requested documents before evaluating their relevance and materiality.
153
 
There are a few ways to approach the assessment of burden. For example, when a party 
seeks to object to a request to produce, it could base its arguments on the type of evidence 
requested. Thus it could be argued that, for example, a request for hearsay evidence is 
easier to dispute on grounds of difficulty in producing than more factual documents.
 154
 In 
addition, a party could argue that the cost of producing the requested documents is too high 
compared to the monetary interest of the dispute. However, if the requested evidence is 
paramount to the conclusion of the dispute, it is not beyond the arbitral tribunal’s power to 
order it produced despite the cost or burden. The tribunal can also take into account the 
fact that the costs of producing the requested documents can be reimbursable costs, 
provided that the parties have agreed on the costs of document production being 
reimbursable. This would naturally make it easier to accept a request to produce, as the 
requesting party might eventually end up responsible for the costs of the efforts required 
from the requested party.
155
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All in all, any objections made on the grounds of costs and burden should always be 
assessed in the context of the dispute at hand. It is worth noting that the expectations of the 
parties can also be a factor in deciding whether or not the objection is valid: if both parties 
come from a similar legal background, they probably have similar views on what 
constitutes an unreasonably burdensome request to produce.
156
 While the provision of the 
IBA Rules is not specifically defined, parties should be generally expected to make at least 
a reasonable attempt at producing the required documents, provided that there are no other 
reasons to object than the arduousness of the document production. 
 Loss or Destruction of Documents 3.5.3.
Understandably, it would be futile to require the production of documents that do not exist, 
or are otherwise completely unavailable to the requested party. However, a simple claim of 
non-existence or loss of documents cannot be deemed adequate to validly block a request 
to produce. Thus, a party seeking to resort to such an objection needs to provide sufficient 
proof of the loss or destruction of the documents in question. The arbitral tribunal must 
then assess whether the loss or destruction has been reasonably proved, and if the 
circumstances have been purely accidental or otherwise unintentional on the part of the 
party invoking the objection. Similarly to documents claimed to be unavailable to the 
requested party, if a party fails to give a reasonable excuse for the loss or destruction of the 
documents, or has intentionally destroyed or lost the requested documents, the arbitral 
tribunal should consider drawing adverse inferences.
157
 It is worth noting that the 
intentional destruction or loss of relevant documents could easily be interpreted as a breach 
of the duty to act in good faith, thus leading to repercussions described in article 9.7
158
. 
 Non-Existing Documents 3.5.4.
It is important to note that the IBA Rules do not include a specific provision about 
objecting on the grounds that the requested documents do not exist. However, the existence 
of the requested documents is clearly a prerequisite for submitting a request to produce, 
and thus does not require an explicit provision for a party to possess the right to refuse 
production on grounds of non-existence of the requested documents. In addition, a party is 
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in any case only obligated to produce documents that are in its possession, which 
obviously do not include any non-existing documents. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of a 
party to make the statement of non-existence when this is the case.
159
 
 Technical or Commercial Confidentiality and Political or Institutional Sensitivity  3.5.5.
There is no clear agreement between scholars on whether or not arbitration inherently 
includes a duty of confidentiality. While it is clear that the parties wish to resolve disputes 
without putting state secrets or their commercial standing to risk, too much focus on 
confidentiality would put the integrity and transparency of the arbitral proceedings at risk. 
This problem is further complicated, for example, by the confidentiality relationships the 
parties have with third parties. As such, the problem becomes dependant on whether 
parties have agreed to allow confidentiality claims, and how broad these agreements are.
160
 
However, there is a general consensus that document production in international arbitration 
is in most cases at least to some extent limited by confidentiality
161
. 
Nevertheless, the IBA Rules include the possibility for a party to object to a request to 
produce on grounds of technical or commercial confidentiality, or political or institutional 
insensitivity. The provision dealing with political documents was added due to expressed 
concern that the category of technical or commercial confidentiality would not include 
confidentiality within international political organisations
162
. The assessment of the 
strength of the objection is left fully to the arbitral tribunal, as the only criterion explicitly 
stated is that the confidentiality of the documents must be deemed compelling. This raises 
the question of what exactly is meant by “compelling.” The wording is left vague in order 
to allow flexibility in conforming to wildly different concepts and limits of confidentiality 
present in an international setting. Therefore, arbitral tribunals should take special care 
when reviewing confidentiality claims. The obvious sources for rules on confidentiality 
would be the arbitral agreement, the lex arbitri and other laws and provisions applied to the 
arbitration. 
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 The wording of the provision also suggests that the burden of proof is inherently on the 
side of the objecting party
163
. This seems fairly reasonable, as it would be difficult for the 
requesting party to provide proof of the requested documents not including confidential 
information. Consequently, parties should take care to use confidentiality claims only 
when absolutely necessary to avoid adverse inferences if the tribunal deems the objection 
not to be compelling enough. In an ideal situation, the parties should agree on the issue of 
confidential information prior to the arbitration. 
 Legal Privilege 3.5.6.
There is no general accepted consensus on what kind of documents fall under the 
protection of legal privilege in international arbitration. This problem is further 
complicated by the fact that legal privileges are defined differently throughout the world, 
and even national legislation sharing a similar legal system might have different views on 
privilege.
164
 Furthermore, parties rarely explicitly cover the issue of privileges in their 
arbitral contracts, and the agreed law governing the contract does not necessarily apply to 
privileges or provide adequate provisions on the matter. As a result, privilege is often left 
to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal, which then faces further problems such as the 
choice of the law governing privileges.
165
 
The approach chosen in the IBA Rules promotes leaving the decision with the arbitral 
tribunal: a party has the power to contest requested document production on grounds of 
privilege, but the arbitral tribunal has broad powers to choose the rules or law governing 
privileges in the arbitration. While article 9.2(b) in itself is clear, it can be seen as 
problematic when contrasted with the general requirement of predictability of procedure. It 
has been suggested that provisions like article 9.2(b) could allow the arbitrators to apply 
their own rules without consulting parties, overriding predictability altogether.
166
 This 
would especially manifest in situations where parties have merely agreed to apply the IBA 
Rules, without specifically defining the rules or laws governing privileges. To address 
these issues, the 2010 revision of the IBA Rules added article 9.3. Said article lists 
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different considerations for the tribunal to take into account when deciding on privilege-
related issues
167
. Consequently, it is reasonable to ask whether or not the addition of more 
detailed provisions concerning privileges has improved the IBA Rules. 
While flexibility is a central concern in international arbitration, it should not take 
precedence over predictability: parties should be able to reasonably predict what 
documents they will be required to produce, and which documents can be withheld on the 
basis of privilege. As privilege does not necessarily cover for example the internal 
documents and communication relating to contract negotiations or client-attorney 
communication, it could become severely difficult for the parties to plan ahead.
168
 Article 
9.3 of the IBA Rules seeks to resolve this problem by providing a middle ground between 
civil and common law interpretations of privilege. However, it is important to note that 
article 9.3 is completely optional, providing only guidelines for the tribunal and the parties 
on what information could be considered to be protected under privilege.
169
 
Article 9.2(b) of the 1999 IBA Rules, which was identical to the 2010 Rules article 9.2(b), 
was considered a useful rule due to its simplicity
170
. However, as stated before, this rule 
allows the tribunal to apply any privilege rules it pleases, possibly hurting the predictability 
of the proceedings. Still, adding more detailed rules on privilege would not necessarily 
prove to be beneficial for the IBA Rules, since there are no accepted common standards 
that could be applied to the extent of privilege. Thus, a more rigid definition of what 
privilege entails could hurt the simplicity of the general rule, especially if only some of the 
problems present in privilege are addressed, but not all.
171
 The current IBA Rules, then, 
have chosen a safe road: they address the issues with article 9.3, providing guidance on 
privilege, but do not force any particular interpretation on the tribunal or the parties
172
. 
While the uncertainty of the principles applied to privilege in international arbitration and 
the lack of uniform rules and practices certainly speak for harmonisation, drafting such 
rules would be significantly difficult. Moreover, a harmonisation attempt could severely 
impact the flexibility of international arbitration.
173
 Therefore, the approach chosen in the 
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current IBA Rules seems reasonable. If the new rules gain as much influence as their 
predecessors, the new article 9.3 could possibly pave way for more substantial universal 
rules and practices concerning privilege. However, it is still advisable that parties agree on 
what rules are to be followed when it comes to privilege, as this would promote 
predictability and discourage needless privilege claims in document production under the 
IBA Rules. 
 Procedural Economy, Proportionality, Fairness and Equality 3.5.7.
The 2010 IBA Rules added the mentions of procedural economy and proportionality to 
article 9.2. This reflects the greater emphasis on effectiveness taken in the 2010 revision of 
the rules.
174
 Consequently, parties can now effectively object to a production request by 
claiming that the requested production of documents would negatively impact the 
procedural economy of the dispute, as well as claim that the request is not in proportion to 
the dispute, or is unfair or unequal. This provision provides the parties an effective way to 
prevent the opposing party from delaying the process or inflating its costs with 
disproportional or unnecessarily extensive requests to produce. However, the rules do not 
express what kind of objections the tribunal should consider compelling enough to exclude 
evidence on the grounds provided in article 9.2(g). This gives the parties the power to 
always object on the grounds presented in the article, possibly leading to delays in the 
process as the parties can object “just in case.”175 Additionally, these kinds of objections 
could be intentionally used to delay the process just as well as unnecessary requests to 
produce, without much fear of adverse consequences as determining the intention of the 
objecting party would be difficult. Furthermore, procedural economy is hardly a clearly 
defined concept. Therefore, parties cannot be sure if there indeed exist grounds to object to 
a request to produce for economical reason, and different tribunals are bound to interpret 
this provision in different ways, leading to inconsistent procedures under the IBA Rules. It 
can also be argued that proportionality already inherently includes procedural economy, as 
disproportionate requests to produce would make the process more burdensome and 
costly.
176
 All in all, the addition of procedural economy and proportionality to article 9.2 
would seem to have both benefits and dangers. Especially proportionality seems to be a 
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good and welcome addition, as it effectively ensures that the process does not veer out of 
control. However, procedural economy seems to be too vague and hard to interpret 
consistently to add anything of real value to the IBA Rules. 
 Good Faith in Objecting to Requests to Produce 3.5.8.
The duty to act in good faith does not only apply to requesting document production, as the 
system for objecting to requests can also be used for questionable purposes. A party could, 
for instance, object to requests to produce without any valid grounds, hoping to delay or 
otherwise negatively affect the proceedings. Such conduct can easily be seen as breaching 
the duty to act in good faith.
177
 However, as discussed in the previous chapters, the valid 
grounds for objecting to requests to produce are far from simple and clear. Especially 
privilege and procedural economy seem to offer considerable freedom of interpretation, 
making the applying of the requirement of good faith somewhat difficult in practice. This, 
of course, gives the parties even more reason to make sure they understand and agree on 
what evidence is protected by privilege. When it comes to procedural economy, parties 
have little real power to agree on its scope. As the tribunals would understandably be 
hesitant in condemning these objections on bad-faith grounds, this would seemingly allow 
parties to submit objections on economic grounds without having to fear for breaching the 
duty to act in good faith, aside from the most transparent attempts at affecting the process 
negatively. 
3.6. Electronic Production of Documents 
 The Special Nature of Electronic Documents 3.6.1.
It is an undeniable fact that as technology progresses, storing information in electronic 
form is becoming more and more the standard in business life. This naturally means that 
electronic documents should be subject to the same evidentiary procedures as tangible 
paper documents, as electronic information can have just as much evidentiary value as 
traditional documents. However, the very nature of electronic documents leads to very 
distinct and unique practical problems. For this reason electronic disclosure has been the 
topic of intense debate among practitioners and researchers alike. It would seem that these 
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problems require special regulation, especially when it comes to the melting pot of legal 
systems that is international arbitration.
178
 
Electronically stored documents have several key differences from paper documents, the 
most obvious being the sheer volume of information present in electric form. As electronic 
communication and storage is cheap, fast and easy, the amount of relevant documents 
created and stored in electronic form can be overwhelming in a large arbitration.
179
 
Unsurprisingly, this means that both the length and the costs of arbitration can skyrocket as 
the arbitral tribunal is faced with the task of reviewing vast amounts of data to find relevant 
and material information
180
. This problem is further emphasised by the fact that e-mails are 
an especially tempting target for discovery procedures, as e-mail is increasingly used for 
business communication and often includes information that was communicated orally in 
the past and thus unrecoverable for evidence purposes
181
. 
Electronic documents can be stored in a plethora of different places and mediums. between 
different types of electronic memory, external and internal drives and storage media, it can 
be especially difficult to locate the relevant information, or to determine where it 
originated.
 182
 It also means that it becomes harder to determine if the duplicates are in fact 
identical, or if some of them include added information not present in the other copies or 
versions. This can also lead to problems of jurisdictional power when attempting to bring 
electronic information as evidence into an international arbitration process. In addition, the 
ways of storing, labelling and cataloguing electronic documents are hardly consistent, 
meaning that important or relevant information might be stored almost anywhere and thus 
difficult to locate by the limited discovery measures often allowed in international 
arbitration. This all amounts to greater burden and increased costs of document 
disclosure.
183
 
Furthermore, it is not easy to destroy electronic information, at least in any final capacity. 
Deleting a document does not mean it cannot be recovered with proper means. 
Additionally, many companies keep back-ups of their documents. This complicates 
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disclosure procedures, as it is not at all clear what kind of measures a party can be expected 
or ordered to take to recover supposedly deleted relevant documents, especially when the 
author of said documents never intended for them to be saved. This is especially 
problematic when a party has deleted a relevant document, but a duplicate could be found 
in the files or storage of a third party. Electronic documents also require specific programs 
or ways to properly access them, further complicating document production.
184
 
Finally, electronic documents are more easily modifiable than their paper counterparts, and 
any made changes are significantly harder to detect in electronic form. Sometimes, 
electronic documents can be updated and changed automatically, without any actual human 
intervention. Thus it becomes problematic to determine, for example, if a document has 
been tampered with intentionally, or if the changes have simply been automated. 
Furthermore, it is hardly clear if a party could be obligated to produce earlier versions of 
updated documents.
185
 
Of course, electronic disclosure of documents also has clear benefits: organising, searching 
and transporting data is faster, easier and cheaper than ever before. Naturally, this makes it 
easier for parties and arbitrators alike to comb through all the data present in an arbitration 
and find the relevant information more efficiently. Computer programs can perform many 
of the searching and filtering tasks that previously consumed human work-hours and 
resources. However, these benefits are almost entirely lost without proper limits and 
regulations imposed on electronic disclosure, as limitless ability to request electronic 
documents to be produced would lead to an unmanageable amount of documents to be 
present in arbitration.
186
 
The impact of the rise of electronic documentation is perhaps most severely felt in 
common law countries. As common law systems often allow far more large-scale 
disclosure requests than their civil law counterparts, the volume of electronic documents 
can lead to substantial problems in evidentiary procedures. However, when it comes to 
international arbitration the problems present are of a somewhat different nature: the 
difficulty in limiting electronic document disclosure and applying the existing practices of 
document production might bring document production in international arbitration closer 
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to common law discovery. Therefore, it is important for international arbitration to develop 
its own rules regarding e-disclosure, and attempt to find the best practices therein to 
maintain the flexibility that is a central part of international arbitration.
187
 
 Electronic Disclosure in the 2010 IBA Rules 3.6.2.
As the IBA Rules have been commonly described as providing the outline of the best 
evidentiary practices present in international arbitration, as well as striking a sound balance 
between common and civil law procedures, it would therefore be consistent for the rules to 
address electronic disclosure. The 1999 iteration of the IBA Rules merely included a 
mention of electronic evidence in the definition of documents, opting to not address 
electronic disclosure further. As such, the document production rules applied identically to 
all types of evidence. This is certainly justified, as the basic principles are fundamentally 
the same for both tangible as well as electronic documents.
188
 
E-disclosure was specifically addressed in the 2010 revision due to its increased 
importance in international arbitration. However, the IBA Rules do not explicitly require 
the production of electronic documents. Instead, electronic disclosure is required only if 
the parties have agreed to allow it or the arbitral tribunal orders it. Therefore, the 
provisions of the IBA Rules are only meant to provide a framework for e-disclosure when 
necessary.
189
 Article 3.3(a)(ii) states: 
“in the case of Documents maintained in electronic form, the requesting Party may, 
or the Arbitral Tribunal may order that it shall be required to, identify specific files, 
search terms, individuals or other means of searching for such Documents in an 
efficient and economical manner.” 
Thus, when it comes to electronic disclosure, the IBA Rules do not specifically include 
separate rules about electronic disclosure, but instead the same principles applied to 
requesting paper documents apply to electronic documents: requests for production of 
electronic documents are limited by the requirements of specificity, relevance, materiality, 
and possession outlined in article 3.3. Concurrently, a party has the ability to object to e-
disclosure requests on the same grounds as to any other type of request to produce. Article 
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3.3(a)(ii) is simply meant to provide parties and tribunals with additional tools to narrow 
down the search for documents. This is especially important since normally 
unobjectionable requests to produce could lead to extremely burdensome searches when 
aimed at electronic documents. A party can, for example, be ordered to specify a 
timeframe during which the requested document or category of documents was created or 
modified to narrow a search down.
190
 Therefore, it is clear that the IBA Rules do not 
promote US-style broad electronic discovery, but instead maintain a more restrictive and 
narrow scope of electronic disclosure
191
. 
The important part to note about article 3.3(a)(ii) is that it does not allow a party to request 
electronic disclosure on keywords or filenames alone. The requested documents should 
always be sufficiently identified to meet the other requirements of article 3.3. For example, 
a simple search term or a list of search terms should not be sufficient to consider a request 
to produce to be specified and narrow enough, as search terms are simply means to access 
the requested electronic documents. Allowing such requests would permit parties to far too 
easily embark on “fishing expeditions” for documents, which would go against the basic 
goals set for the IBA Rules.
192
 
Parties should strive to agree on possible keyword and file lists, as the requested party is 
often the one better equipped to determine the most effective means of searching for the 
requested documents. Presumably, the requested party is also more familiar with their own 
computer systems and storing protocols for electronic documents. Furthermore, if parties 
disagree on the scope of the search, it falls to the tribunal to determine the scale of the 
search a party is allowed to request.
193
 Such a situation could be undesirable to a party, as 
tribunals can hardly be expected to have any more knowledge on the systems of the 
requested party than the requesting party. 
Another addition to the IBA Rules concerning electronic evidence is article 3.12(b), which 
states: 
“Documents that a Party maintains in electronic form shall be submitted or 
produced in the form most convenient or economical to it that is reasonably usable 
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by the recipients, unless the Parties agree otherwise or, in the absence of such 
agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal decides otherwise.” 
This provision serves to alleviate the costs and burden of transforming electronic 
documents into paper form, as well as make it easier for parties and tribunals to review the 
submitted documents and conduct searches on them. If parties do not agree on the most 
appropriate form, the tribunal will decide it pursuant to article 3.12(b).
194
 
The approach to e-disclosure taken in the IBA Rules is a careful one. While the few 
provisions made especially for e-disclosure are useful, they do not attempt to resolve any 
specific problems associated with electronic evidence. However, at the moment there 
probably is no need to more substantially address e-disclosure in the IBA Rules, as this 
would hurt the flexibility of the IBA Rules by forcing the parties to adopt specific 
procedures for e-disclosure. Simply allowing for the possibility of e-disclosure and certain 
specific methods for utilising it are enough, as this allows parties to craft a e-disclosure 
system suitable to their specific disputes
195
. Additionally, more substantial rule changes 
might lead to parties referring to those provisions even when they would not apply
196
. 
4. The Powers of the Arbitral Tribunal under the IBA Rules 
4.1. General Powers 
Following the current trends present in international arbitration, the IBA Rules provide 
arbitral tribunals with vast authority in document production. Article 1.5 states: 
“Insofar as the IBA Rules of Evidence and the General Rules are silent on any 
matter concerning the taking of evidence and the Parties have not agreed otherwise, 
the Arbitral Tribunal shall conduct the taking of evidence as it deems appropriate, in 
accordance with the general principles of the IBA Rules of Evidence.” 
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Therefore, the authority of arbitral tribunals is limited only by the agreement of the parties 
and the procedural law of the arbitration
197
. However, it should be noted that the IBA 
Rules emphasise that arbitral tribunals should follow the general principles of the rules in 
any and all situations concerning evidence taking. The general principles are also 
emphasised in article 1.4, which states that the tribunals should resolve any disputes 
concerning the meaning of the rules according to the stated purpose of the IBA Rules. The 
general principles, such as flexibility, fairness and efficiency, are spelled out in the 
preamble to the rules.
198
 It is important to note that the preamble to the IBA Rules also 
include good faith as a general principle. 
These general powers given to arbitral tribunals in the absence of an agreement between 
the parties are in line with most international arbitration rules and conventions. For 
example, the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration article 
IV(4)(d) provides arbitral tribunals with general authority to conduct an arbitration the way 
it deems most effective. This is also the case in the UNCITRAL Model Law, as article 
19(2) provides arbitral tribunals similar powers as the IBA Rules. It is important to note 
that in the absence of party agreement a tribunal can also choose to follow national 
procedural rules, if it so pleases. This is, however, rare.
199
 It is also important to note that 
in addition to party autonomy, a tribunal’s general authority is limited by the lex arbitri 
and any mandatory procedural rules applying to the arbitration, as already discussed in 
chapter 2.5. 
4.2. Document Disclosure Procedures 
 Preliminary Consultation 4.2.1.
The 2010 revision of the IBA Rules saw the addition of an entirely new article 2, which 
concerns the responsibility of an arbitral tribunal to consult the parties on evidence taking 
procedures. The tribunal must consult parties at the earliest appropriate time, and should 
also invite the parties to consult each other on procedural matters. Article 2.2 lists possible 
issues which may be addressed during these consultations, although the list is not 
exhaustive. Finally, article 2.3 urges a tribunal to inform parties of any issues the tribunal 
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deems relevant and material, and which might require preliminary determination. This 
should be done at the tribunal’s earliest convenience. 
The mandatory requirement to consult parties provides an excellent venue to address the 
interpretation issues discussed in chapters 3.4 and 3.5. Even if parties have not agreed on 
accurate limits for requesting document production, the consulting required in article 2 
should be used to address these questions. However, arbitral tribunals should take care to 
limit the discussion only to issues that are relevant to the dispute at hand, as every issue is 
not be relevant in every arbitration. Conversely, the procedure described in article 2 should 
not be considered the only chance to consult parties on any issues, as tribunals should do 
so whenever a new issue becomes relevant.
200
 
Article 2 provides arbitral tribunals with an excellent chance to address e-disclosure. If 
there is a possibility that e-disclosure will become relevant to the arbitration, the arbitral 
tribunal should bring it up, as this promotes a more transparent process and allows the 
parties to be better prepared to the evidence taking procedures. To avoid confusion and 
needless burden later in the dispute, the tribunal should especially discuss the scope and 
means of e-disclosure. However, if e-disclosure will not be an issue in an arbitration, the 
tribunal might not wish to invite the issues into the arbitration by addressing them before 
they have become relevant.
201
 
 Assessing the Necessity of Requests to Produce 4.2.2.
As stated before, arbitral tribunals will generally accept any evidence that they see as 
significant to the resolution of the dispute
202
. Ultimately, this means that it is the arbitral 
tribunal that makes the final decision on any requests for document production. In addition, 
the IBA Rules give tribunals the authority to decide which of the documents produced to 
the requesting party the arbitrators wish to receive. As the requested documents need no 
longer be automatically produced to tribunals, this allows the tribunals to effectively 
control their own workload and only concentrate on relevant evidence.
203
 Tribunals should 
also indicate early on whether parties will have a chance to refine their requests to produce 
in case the tribunal deems them too broad or otherwise objectionable. This allows parties 
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to plan and draft their requests accordingly. Arbitrators can also review submitted requests 
beforehand and demand revisions they deem necessary, as the tribunal can and should 
provide advice to parties on drafting requests to produce. This way, the tribunal can 
effectively manage document production and ensure that it does not have to unnecessarily 
deal with too broad or otherwise burdensome document production requests.
204
 
An arbitral tribunal consider any and all objections to requests to produce and makes the 
decision based on the requested documents and the validity of the objections. The 
interpretation of the requirements for requests to produce and grounds for objecting are 
already discussed in detail in chapters 3.4. and 3.5, respectively, and thus need not be 
repeated here. It is also important to note that article 9.2 of the IBA Rules allows for the 
arbitral tribunal to reject a request to produce of its own volition, if it deems the request to 
be objectionable. This effectively allows arbitral tribunals to limit document production to 
only relevant and material documents, as well as make sure that arbitrations are conducted 
in a fair and efficient manner. 
An arbitral tribunal may, if it is necessary for reaching a decision on the admissibility of a 
requested document, view a document that is being requested. However, this might prove 
to be problematic, especially if the requesting party seeks to object to the request on the 
grounds of confidentiality, as the party might argue that after viewing the document the 
tribunal would not be able to treat the parties equally.
205
 One option would be to produce 
the requested document only to the tribunal. However, this could constitute a breach of due 
process requirements, and thus is not preferable, unless all parties have agreed to allow 
such procedures. Still, even when an agreement exists, it is not clear if due process can be 
waived by agreeing to produce a document only to the tribunal. It would seem that this is 
only possible if parties have agreed to the procedure after the issue has arisen, when they 
have become fully aware of all the facts of the problem.
206
 
To address these problems, the IBA Rules include article 3.8 which allows, in exceptional 
situations, for appointing and independent expert to review the requested document and 
report on the objection. The expert is bound by confidentiality and cannot report the 
contents of the document to the tribunal or other parties. This only applies to the extent the 
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tribunal upholds the objection. While article 6 of the IBA Rules deals with tribunal-
appointed experts, it is important to note that appointing an expert pursuant to article 3.8 
does not necessarily need to follow rules set forth in article 6
207
. This would mean, for 
example, that the appointed expert cannot be cross-examined by the parties. As the expert 
described in article 3.8 is only meant to provide the tribunal with sufficient information to 
rule on an objection to a request to produce, it might be inconvenient and burdensome to 
subject such an expert to the provisions of article 6. However, the IBA Rules do not 
explicitly forbid applying article 6 along with article 3.8, leaving both options open for the 
tribunal or the parties to agree on. In any case, arbitral tribunals should be careful when 
considering appointing experts to review requested documents, as it could increase the 
costs of the arbitration and unnecessarily slow down the process. 
Furthermore, the IBA Rules also include an implicit requirement of confidentiality, as 
article 3.13 states that any document that is not in public domain is to be kept confidential 
by the tribunal and the parties, and only used in conjunction with the arbitration. Only 
exceptions provided in the article are the fulfilling of a legal duty, protecting or pursuing a 
legal right or enforcing or challenging an award in legal proceedings before a state court or 
other judicial authority. While this provision is certainly helpful in alleviating the fears of 
the parties, it has the same problem as any confidentiality agreement: in the end, it is 
difficult to prove who disclosed the confidential information after the confidential 
information has become public knowledge.
208
 
As procedural rulings on document requests are typically not awards, the parties cannot 
contest them, unless otherwise stated in the lex arbitri
209
. Article 3.6 also provides arbitral 
tribunals with the possibility to invite parties to discuss their requests to produce in order to 
see if the parties can reach an agreement on disclosure. As a party agreement is preferable 
to a tribunal ruling, it is recommended that tribunals use this power whenever they can. 
However, while doing so the tribunals should take costs and efficiency of the arbitration 
into consideration. 
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In addition to consultations pursuant to article 3.6, arbitral tribunals should also consider 
employing other means to streamline document production and avoid unnecessary 
procedures. One example of such means is the Redfern schedule, a schedule that parties 
and their counsels fill up during their negotiations on requests to produce. This schedule 
includes a description of the requested document or category of documents, a statement as 
to why these documents are relevant to the case and material to its outcome, and a 
statement by the requested party describing if and to what extent they are willing to accede 
to the request, and on what grounds they are objecting to it. This then allows the tribunal to 
accurately pinpoint the possible issues it needs to consider when assessing a request to 
produce, without the need for excessive consulting of the parties. The Redfern schedule 
also helps the tribunal determine if it needs to request additional information from the 
parties. All this serves to save costs and make the evidence taking procedures more 
efficient and smooth.
210
 
Additionally, pursuant to article 3.10 of the IBA Rules, an arbitral tribunal can 
independently order a party to produce or obtain any documents it deems important to the 
resolution of the arbitration. The requested party can object to any such request on the 
same grounds as they could object to a request submitted by the other party. The arbitral 
tribunal must then make a decision on whether or not there exist valid grounds for the 
objection. The question then becomes, should the arbitral tribunal request documents to be 
produced when the parties opt to refrain from such requests. Ultimately, it is the aim of the 
arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute according to the facts of the case. Therefore, when a 
party possesses documents material and relevant to the case, the arbitral tribunal should 
certainly exercise its power to request those documents.
211
 However, while article 3.10 
provides arbitral tribunals with a fairly vast authority to request document production, the 
tribunals should take care not to use this power too eagerly. If parties have agreed to 
exclude certain issues from the scope of the arbitration, the presiding tribunal should not 
start an investigation of its own volition
212
. In general, tribunals should take care not to 
request documents to be produced against common wishes of the parties. 
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 Documents in the Possession of Third Parties 4.2.3.
Article 3.9 of the IBA Rules provides arbitral tribunals and parties with the power to 
request third parties to produce documents relevant to the arbitration and material to its 
outcome. Article 3.9 allows for the use of any steps “legally available” to obtain the 
document in question. It should be noted that the third party whom the request is aimed at 
can object to the request on the same grounds as the parties could if they were requested 
for documents. Therefore, the IBA Rules only provide a framework for obtaining 
documents from third parties, as the actual provisional measures available to tribunals are 
left to the rules of the lex arbitri and procedural law applied to the arbitration.
213
 
The broad procedural powers of an arbitral tribunal do not mean that it can exercise its 
powers on a third party, as a third party is not party to the agreement that initially gives the 
tribunal its authority. Thus, the tribunal only has as much authority over third parties as the 
laws applying to the arbitration allow. This is also the case in an arbitration where the IBA 
Rules are applied, as the IBA Rules only provide that the tribunal can use any means 
available to it.
214
 Sometimes national legislation provides the arbitral tribunal direct powers 
to obtain documents from third parties. For example, the English Arbitration Act sections 
43 and 44 provide arbitral tribunals the power to use the same procedures that are available 
to courts when securing witnesses and evidence. It is notable that these powers apply even 
when the seat of the arbitration is not in England, provided that the hearings are held in 
England. However, the sections in question do not provide a court with general power to 
order document production. Instead, the scope of document production order is limited, as 
the sought documents must be sufficiently specified.
215
 In addition, tribunals and the 
parties are often provided with the possibility of asking for court assistance when ordering 
document production. This is also explicitly stated in the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 
27. It is important to note that seeking court assistance under the UNCITRAL Model Law 
always requires the permission of the arbitral tribunal. However, the language of the Model 
Law does not make it clear whether it only permits assistance in evidence taking in a 
limited sense, or whether it could also permit seeking court assistance for broad pre-trial 
discovery. While the interpretation of the wording of the Model Law is certainly up for 
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debate, it would be unusual for a court to impede on the discretion of an arbitral tribunal in 
determining an appropriate scope of document disclosure in an arbitration.
216
 
Interestingly, section 1782 of Title 28 of the United States Code offers foreign tribunals a 
possibility to seek for assistance in document production from a US court, when the 
possessor of the sought documents is within the jurisdiction of the court. This provision 
has been subjected to some criticism from commentators, as it could allow unwelcome US 
court interference in international arbitrations. It has even been suggested that parties 
should take section 1782 into account when drafting arbitration agreements.  However, US 
courts have been careful when applying said provision. Moreover, section 1782 certainly 
offers a useful way to obtain relevant documents that would otherwise be unavailable to 
tribunals.
217
 
It is important to note that an arbitral tribunal does not have any inherent power to enforce 
its document production orders directed at third parties, unless the lex arbitri explicitly 
provides the tribunal with such powers. This, however, is rare. For example, the Finnish 
Arbitration Act Section 27 explicitly denies the arbitral tribunal any such powers. 
However, document production orders of arbitral tribunals are generally followed. In some 
cases, if a third party refuses to comply with a production order, the tribunal might have 
the right to draw adverse inferences.
218
 
All in all, the IBA Rules provide a competent framework for obtaining relevant documents 
from third parties while still maintaining the flexibility required for the rules to be valid in 
vastly differing arbitrations. However, parties, as well as tribunals, should take care to be 
aware of the available measures of obtaining evidence from third parties in their particular 
arbitration, as the IBA Rules do not provide any explicit provisions on seeking court 
assistance. 
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4.3. Failure to Comply with Document Production Orders 
 Enforcing Production Orders 4.3.1.
An arbitral tribunal does not inherently possess general authority to enforce its evidentiary 
orders. This means that, similar to ordering the production of documents in the possession 
of third parties, the tribunal’s enforcement powers depend on the lex arbitri and the 
procedural law applied to the arbitration. It then follows that the tribunal might not be able 
to impose sanctions if a party refuses to follow an issued document production order. 
Naturally, this might prove to be a problem, as the lack of sanctions could have a negative 
effect on the authority of the tribunal, as well as allow for the parties to employ 
questionable tactics without a risk of negative consequences.
219
 However, there exists 
some disagreement about whether the parties can agree to give the tribunal authority to 
impose sanctions. Some argue that the inherent lack of statutory basis and enforcement 
powers mean that an arbitral tribunal is unable to attach penalties to its orders. Still, others 
see no reason why an arbitral tribunal could not impose sanctions, provided such powers 
are not explicitly prohibited by the arbitration agreement between the parties.
220
 
Furthermore, a tribunal could allocate costs of the arbitration based on the conduct of the 
parties, but the allocated costs would only be limited to the additional costs caused by the 
conduct that is being sanctioned
221
. 
In some jurisdictions national law allows for a tribunal to impose sanctions on its own, 
while some jurisdictions only allow this indirectly through court assistance. Furthermore, 
in some jurisdictions the tribunal’s powers of enforcement might not be limited at all by 
national legislation, while in others the tribunal might be left with no way to enforce its 
orders. For example, the Finnish Arbitration Act prohibits the tribunal to use any 
enforcement measures on its own, but allows for court assistance in securing the tribunal’s 
orders. This is the case even when parties have agreed otherwise in their arbitration 
agreement.
222
 Conversely, for example the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure Article 1056 
explicitly allows the arbitral tribunal to impose penalties for non-compliance. It is 
important to note that the UNCITRAL Model Law article 27 allows for seeking court 
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assistance when available. For example, in the case Vibroflotation AG v Express Builders 
CO Ltd it was decided that article 27 allowed subpoenas to be issued to compel document 
production. 
For the most part, the IBA Rules do not address the enforcement powers of tribunals 
beyond the mention of “any steps legally available” in article 3.9. Thus, the authority of a 
tribunal is left to be determined by the lex arbitri and the applicable procedural law. 
Naturally, if there is a lack of mandatory rules limiting the enforcement measures 
available, the parties can agree on the penalties the arbitral tribunal can impose on non-
compliance. However, the IBA Rules do not leave the arbitral tribunal completely toothless 
in the absence of additional legal sources of authority over sanctions: article 9 allows the 
tribunal to draw adverse inferences and allocate costs based on breaches of good faith. 
These are discussed in the next chapters. 
 Adverse Inferences 4.3.2.
The power to draw adverse inferences when a party refuses to comply with ordered 
production offers some incentive for a party to produce any ordered documents, even when 
they would be adverse to the party’s case. Effectively, an arbitral tribunal can interpret 
missing or unproduced evidence to be adverse to the requested party. To an extent, this 
allows for the arbitral tribunal to ensure the effectiveness and fairness of the arbitration 
while discouraging questionable conduct.
223
 However, adverse inferences cannot be 
classified strictly as sanctions or penalties, but instead are a form of indirect evidence. 
Thus, the tribunal must also take into account issues such as burden and standard of proof 
while considering adverse inferences.
224
 
In most cases, the burden of proof is on the claimant. This effectively means that the 
claimant must prove their claim to such an extent that the claim can be presumed to be 
true. When this happens, the opposing party must prove that what is claimed is, in fact, 
untrue.
225
 While this might be described as a shifting of the burden of proof, it in fact is 
only a shifting of the burden to produce evidence: the burden of proof stays with the 
claimant, while the other party now has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to 
                                                 
223 Sharpe 2006 p. 550. 
224 Van Houtte 2009 p. 198 and 200. 
225 Van Houtte 2009 p. 196. 
64 
 
refute the claim
226
. As adverse inferences are considered a part of the overall evidence 
produced in the dispute at hand, it then follows that if the party who has the burden of 
proof has not sufficiently proven its claims, the adverse inferences drawn from the 
opposing party’s refusal to produce evidence might not be enough to conclude the issue in 
favour of the claimant. Conversely, if a party has sufficiently proven its claims, it might 
not be necessary to draw adverse inferences if the opposing party refuses to produce 
evidence. As adverse inference is classified as indirect evidence, it alone cannot be the 
deciding factor in a case. Instead, adverse inference must be weighed against all the other 
evidence present in the dispute.
227
  
It then follows that adverse inference has only limited effect on the final award, and only 
becomes important in situations where it can tip the scales in favour of one party
228
. It has 
been suggested that drawing adverse inferences could, in practice, extend beyond the initial 
non-production of documents, as a tribunal might take a sceptical stand towards future 
evidence provided by the non-compliant party
229
. While this is certainly possible, it would 
seem that arbitrators are generally reluctant to draw adverse inferences, even when a party 
refuses to cooperate
230
. 
As adverse inferences are not a rarity in international arbitration rules, the IBA Rules also 
give tribunals the authority to draw them in article 9.5, which states: 
“If a Party fails without satisfactory explanation to produce any Document requested 
in a Request to Produce to which it has not objected in due time or fails to produce 
any Document ordered to be produced by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Arbitral 
Tribunal may infer that such document would be adverse to the interests of that 
Party.” 
The first important notion is that the documents in question must have been requested or 
ordered to be produced before adverse inferences can be drawn. This means that adverse 
inferences cannot be drawn from failing to voluntarily produce documents. Evidently, this 
distinction rarely becomes important, as it is in the interest of the opposing party to request 
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any relevant documents in the possession of the other party to be produced when their 
existence becomes known, while failing to voluntarily produce beneficial documents 
already has negative effect on the f the party in possession of the documents.
231
 
The wording of article 9.5 suggests that a production order issued by a tribunal is not 
necessary to draw adverse inferences, but merely a failure to object to a request by the 
other party and then failing produce the requested documents is enough. However, the 
procedure for document production outlined in article 3 of the IBA Rules suggests that if a 
party refuses to produce the requested documents, a tribunal will eventually have to assess 
the request and order the production, provided that the request is valid. It then follows that, 
effectively, an order from the tribunal is a prerequisite for adverse inferences. 
Consequently, adverse inferences can only be drawn if the initial request for document 
production is deemed acceptable according to the requirements of article 3.3. In addition, 
due process requires that non-compliant parties must be given a proper chance to object to 
requests to produce. Naturally, the existence of valid grounds for objection excludes the 
possibility to draw adverse inferences.
232
  
However, even if a tribunal has accepted a request to produce as valid and ordered the 
requested party to produce documents, non-compliance should not automatically lead to 
drawing adverse inferences. Article 9.5 of the IBA Rules only offers the absolute minimum 
conditions that need to be fulfilled to allow drawing adverse inferences. In practice, 
tribunals should always consider carefully whether to interpret non-compliance as 
indication of the presumed negative contents of the documents in question.
233
 For example, 
arbitral tribunals frequently grant document requests even when the requesting party has 
not fully shown that the requested documents in fact exist and are in the custody, 
possession or control of the opposing party
234
. Therefore, it would be negligent to draw 
adverse inferences when the existence or possession of the requested documents is unclear.  
Furthermore, a tribunal should not draw adverse inferences when the requested documents 
are in the possession of a non-compliant third party. To an extent, this applies even when 
the third party is controlled by the requested party, as the party cannot be expected to force 
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a third party to produce documents. However, if the tribunal determines that the requested 
party in fact had access to the documents or has not taken appropriate action to procure the 
documents from the third party, adverse inferences can be drawn. If the non-compliance is 
due to the loss or destruction of the documents in question, should a tribunal consider 
drawing adverse inferences, it should make certain that the requested party is responsible 
for the reason why the documents cannot be produced.
235
  
Finally, tribunals can only draw adverse inferences if the contents of the documents are 
reasonably well established. This is because a tribunal can only draw inferences the 
requested documents would have shown to be true. This also means that the drawn adverse 
inferences cannot be drawn about minor details, but only about the general contents of the 
documents. For example, a tribunal might infer that the requested document would prove 
an existence of a debt between the parties, but without further proof of the details the 
tribunal cannot draw inferences of the amount of the debt.
236
 All in all, adverse inferences 
should always be consistent with the facts and overall evidence present in the case at hand. 
Tribunals should certainly not draw inference that goes against what has already been 
sufficiently proven by other evidence, even if the non-compliance of the requested party is 
clearly intentional and unjustified.
237
 Thus, adverse inference has only limited applicability 
as a sanction or a punitive measure, and should first and foremost be considered a form of 
indirect evidence. 
Article 9.5 of the IBA Rules, in combination with the document production regime 
established in article 3 of the rules, offers a distinct yet flexible framework for drawing 
adverse inferences. However, drawing adverse inferences should not be solely based on the 
minimum requirements presented in the IBA Rules, but should also include further 
considerations of the burden of proof and evidentiary weight, as well as the overall 
evidence provided in the case. Tribunals should be especially careful when weighing the 
importance of adverse inferences to the overall resolution of the case, as primary evidence 
should always take precedence. This is especially important when the drawn adverse 
inferences are vague or inconsequential.
238
 
                                                 
235 Sharpe 2006 p. 557-558 and Van Houtte 2009 p. 204. 
236 Van Houtte 2009 p. 206. 
237 Sharpe 2006 p. 560-563. 
238 Darwazeh 2002 p. 108. 
67 
 
Interestingly, the IBA Rules are silent on whether tribunals should give advance notice to 
the non-compliant party when adverse inference is being sought. The absence of such 
provision would suggest that under the IBA Rules a tribunal does not necessarily need to 
give advance notice when drawing adverse inferences. However, it can be argued that the 
tribunal indeed should always give warning to the non-compliant party; if the tribunal does 
not give advance notice of adverse inference, this might constitute a breach of due process 
and therefore create valid grounds to contest the final award
239
. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that due process requires tribunals to give the requested party a proper opportunity 
to refute the suggested adverse inference not just by producing the requested document, but 
also by providing other evidence or proof against the inference. Therefore, it is certainly in 
the interest of the tribunal to give advance notice in order to avoid breaching due 
process.
240
 One could also argue that in an arbitration where the parties have agreed to 
apply the IBA Rules, the parties could be assumed to be aware of the possibility of adverse 
inferences as consequence of non-compliance, and thus be able to prepare for the risk. 
Therefore advance notice could be said to be unnecessary, as the parties can be interpreted 
to have ample opportunity to provide opposing evidence when objecting to a request to 
produce. However, the framework for adverse inference provided by the IBA Rules is far 
too general to allow the parties to properly predict the specific adverse inference they 
might need to refute.  
Therefore, it is curious that the IBA Rules leave the advance notice of adverse inferences 
unaddressed. A requirement to give advance notice certainly would not hurt the flexibility 
or efficiency of arbitration proceedings under the IBA Rules. However, allowing the non-
compliant party additional possibilities to provide evidence to the tribunal might allow the 
party to delay the proceedings by flooding the tribunal with evidence supposedly refuting 
the suggested adverse inference. This would especially impact situations where the 
grounds for adverse inference are clear from the outset, as allowing a party to attempt to 
refute undeniable adverse inferences would provide the party a possibility to use delaying 
tactics. However, even then due process should take precedence over the risk of occasional 
misconduct. Additionally, misconduct of this type could easily be interpreted as a breach 
of the duty to act in good faith. Therefore, requiring tribunals to give advance notice of 
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adverse inferences would be a welcome addition to the rules, as this would emphasise and 
promote the principle of due process. 
 Breaches of the Duty to Act in Good Faith 4.3.3.
While strictly speaking adverse inferences are not sanctions, the newly added provision in 
article 9.7 of the IBA Rules can certainly be interpreted as such. The article states: 
“If the Arbitral Tribunal determines that a Party has failed to conduct itself in good 
faith in the taking of evidence, the Arbitral Tribunal may, in addition to any other 
measures available under these Rules, take such failure into account in its 
assignment of the costs of the arbitration, including costs arising out of or in 
connection with the taking of evidence.” 
As discussed in chapter 3.2, the IBA Rules do not provide a definition of good faith in 
arbitration proceedings, and varying definitions exist between different legal systems. 
Therefore, article 9.7 opens up considerably broad options for arbitral tribunals to sanction 
any conduct they deem inappropriate. This can be considered somewhat questionable when 
juxtaposed with the requirement of predictability, as parties might have significant 
difficulties in predicting the consequences of their conduct. On the other hand, it would be 
problematic to define the duty to act in good faith within the context and aims of the IBA 
Rules, as a rigid definition might substantially hurt the flexibility of the rules. Therefore, it 
is recommended that a tribunal clearly states what it considers a breach of the duty to act in 
good faith prior to the actual proceedings.
241
 This recommendation is easy to agree with, as 
this way the tribunal could alleviate the possible confusion of the parties regarding good 
faith, and also prevent unpredictable cost allocation to an extent. Furthermore, the 
preliminary consultation required by article 2.3 provides an excellent chance for the 
tribunal to address the duty to act in good faith. 
Neither the IBA Rules nor the commentary on them by the IBA Working Party address the 
extent of a tribunal’s power to assign costs based on bad faith conduct. The wording of 
article 9.7 certainly suggests that tribunals are not limited to allocating the costs of 
document production when sanctioning bad faith conduct in evidentiary proceedings. An 
arbitral tribunal could, therefore, take bad faith conduct into account when allocating the 
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overall costs of the arbitration, effectively allowing the tribunal to use cost allocation as a 
punitive measure against a party who has breached the duty to act in good faith.
242
 
Additionally, it can be argued that a broad interpretation of article 9.7 together with the 
absence of definition for good faith could even allow the tribunal to assign attorney’s and 
arbitrators’ fees to a party that breaches the duty to act in good faith243. On the other hand, 
it can be argued that article 9.7 alone does not effectively allow a tribunal to impose 
anything beyond compensatory costs, as this would be against the basic principle of 
fairness promoted in the IBA Rules. This would mean that tribunals could only assign 
extra costs resulting from bad faith conduct, as fairness would dictate that the party 
responsible for causing extra costs should be responsible for said costs. Furthermore, 
article 9.7 only suggests that a tribunal should take any breaches of good faith into account 
when assigning costs, but does not explicitly allow the tribunal to assign all costs based 
exclusively on article 9.7.
244
 However, it should be noted that costs arising from bad faith 
conduct in evidence taking can be relatively trivial, which could weaken the deterrent 
effect of the power to assign them to the responsible party
245
. 
Parallel to adverse inferences, article 9.7 also raises the question whether tribunals should 
give advance notice when considering imposing consequences for breaches of the duty to 
act in good faith. Naturally, when bad faith conduct is continuous, a tribunal should, in 
order to maintain due process, inform the party in question of the possibility of assigning 
costs based on bad faith conduct. Many of these situations, like a party refusing to comply 
with a production order without valid reasons, also allow a tribunal to draw adverse 
inferences. Thus, the tribunal should give advance notice of both cost allocation and 
adverse inferences, thus giving the affected party a chance to cease the misconduct. 
However, breaches of good faith are often single acts that cannot be foreseen. Therefore, 
when a tribunal considers cost allocation, bad faith conduct has already happened and can 
rarely be rectified afterwards. Thus, a provision requiring advance notice would prove 
difficult to formulate. Therefore, it would be better to leave the consideration of advance 
notice to the tribunals to decide on a case-by-case basis. 
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Finally, article 9.7 specifies that the cost allocation authority of tribunals is based on the 
bad faith conduct of the parties. However, it is not entirely clear if this includes the conduct 
of the counsel of the parties. It can certainly be argued that a counsel acts as a 
representative of a party, and therefore the conduct of a counsel should be seen as part of 
the conduct of the party, allowing the tribunal to allocate costs based on the conduct of a 
counsel. As arbitral tribunals generally do not have any power to sanction misconduct of 
attorneys, article 9.7 could provide a way to promote good faith in the conduct of the 
counsel as well as the conduct of the parties. However, as article 9.7 only applies to 
conduct in the process of evidence taking, the effects on the overall procedure would 
remain fairly limited in this regard.
246
 
All in all, tribunals should be careful when applying article 9.7. As good faith is not 
defined in the IBA Rules, it is important that tribunals clarify to the parties what is 
considered an act of bad faith in the particular arbitration at hand. Tribunals should also 
take care to not allocate overall costs of the arbitration based solely on the acts of bad faith 
in evidence taking, but instead should always assess the overall conduct of the sanctioned 
party. To ensure the fairness of the arbitration, bad faith conduct in evidence taking should 
only be a single factor of many when assigning costs that are not a direct result of conduct 
during the evidence procedures. Despite this, it would not be beneficial for the IBA Rules 
to include a rigid definition of good faith, or explicitly limit cost allocation to the costs 
caused by bad faith conduct. As there is no internationally agreed general practice when it 
comes to good faith in international arbitration or evidence taking in particular, the IBA 
Rules should not, at this stage, force a certain interpretation on anyone seeking to apply the 
rules. For now, the IBA Rules offer a basis for the development of unified practices when 
it comes to good faith in evidence taking in international arbitration. Thus, it is better to 
wait and see how the current rules are applied and interpreted in practice, and if any 
general principles and interpretations will arise. 
5. Conclusions 
The changes made in the 2010 revision to the document production regime of the IBA 
Rules can be characterised as cautious. The IBA Arbitration Committee has clearly 
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approached the revision process with the attitude “what is not broken, does not need to be 
fixed.” Naturally, since the 1999 iteration of the IBA Rules proved to be a major success, 
there was no need for drastic revisions; the rules already provided a working framework 
for document production in international arbitration. However, the changes that were made 
are not without effect, as they aim to address contemporary issues in document production. 
Furthermore, the changes seem to be in line with the ongoing and developing trends in 
international arbitration. 
The main system for document production outlined in articles 2, 3 and 9 is largely 
unchanged. Parties are still required to disclose all documents they intend to rely on and 
the basic requirements for and objections to requests to produce are almost identical to the 
1999 iteration of the rules. As the 1999 IBA Rules already provided an excellent 
framework for document production, any major changes could have crippled the system. 
The changes that have been made seem to aim towards streamlining and clarifying the 
existing process, rather than taking it towards any new directions.  
Arguably, one of the most influential additions is the requirement for consultation prior to 
the actual proceedings. This allows tribunals and parties to both agree on and adequately 
prepare for the document production process. Additionally, the consultation should prove 
to be an excellent chance for tribunals to clarify how they will be interpreting and applying 
the provisions of the IBA Rules in arbitrations, which in turn should improve the 
predictability of evidence procedures.  
When it comes to requests to produce, the added emphasis on the two-pronged test of 
relevance to the case and materiality to its outcome mostly clarifies the interpretation that 
was already present in the 1999 rules. Nonetheless, it will be interesting to see if this 
seemingly minor change will have any real effect on international arbitration proceedings. 
More interestingly, the produced documents no longer need to be automatically produced 
to tribunals. However, the requests themselves are still required to be produced to 
tribunals. This allows arbitral tribunals to both sufficiently assess the request and focus on 
the relevant documents after the request is fulfilled, as the parties can now choose which of 
the produced documents they wish to submit. This serves to make document production 
more efficient and less time consuming than before, as tribunals are no longer forced to 
review all the documents the parties disclose to each other. This addition is certainly a 
welcome one, as the amount of evidence material present in international arbitrations can 
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be unmanageable, to the point it can become a serious problem for arbitrators to review the 
evidence
247
. 
When it comes to objecting to requests to produce, article 9.2 has changed very little. 
However, the few changes made cannot be ignored. The IBA Rules now include the 
possibility to object to a request to produce on grounds of procedural economy, 
proportionality, fairness or equality. This provision clearly promotes the added emphasis 
on effectiveness and fairness of evidence procedures in arbitration, and as such is a 
welcome addition. It effectively allows for tribunals and parties to manage the amount of 
documentary evidence and the costs associated with documentary production. However, 
the rules offer no advice on what kind of objections a tribunal should find compelling 
enough to reject a request to produce. Especially procedural economy seems to be fairly 
well covered by the other three objections mentioned in article 9.2(g), and thus seems to 
add little value to the IBA Rules. Another addition to the rules is article 9.3, which gives 
further advice on interpreting legal privilege. Article 9.3 is certainly a welcome addition, 
giving valuable guidance to the tribunal and the parties on what kind of documents could 
be considered privileged. However, being completely voluntary even when the parties have 
agreed to applying the IBA Rules as binding, the article lacks force. Regardless, at this 
stage it would not serve the flexibility of the IBA Rules to make the provisions of article 
9.3 mandatory, as there exists no clear international consensus on privilege among scholars 
and practitioners. In the future, should  a consensus on privilege emerge, it might become 
topical to consider adding more mandatory provisions to the IBA Rules. Article 9.3 of the 
IBA Rules certainly has potential to become a step towards further harmonisation. 
The new IBA Rules continue their cautious approach when they deal with electronic 
disclosure. While the rules certainly now offer the possibility for electronic disclosure, 
there is barely any detailed provisions on the matter. As electronic disclosure procedures 
can significantly differ between states and legal systems, it is perhaps wise that the IBA 
Rules do not impose a specific regime. If parties wish to apply the IBA Rules and use 
electronic disclosure, they should not trust the IBA Rules alone to provide enough 
guidance on the matter. Instead, parties could agree on more specific procedures or employ 
other available sets of rules, such as the CIArb Protocol for E-Disclosure in Arbitration. 
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Still, the IBA Rules should not at present sacrifice their flexibility in electronic disclosure 
for a more specific procedure. Nevertheless, in the future it might become topical to 
attempt creating a harmonised electronic disclosure procedure, similar to the one already 
provided for traditional document production. 
Arbitrators maintain their fairly vast powers over the procedure and the interpretation of 
the IBA Rules. However, this authority is naturally still limited by party autonomy. As this 
is an established practice of international arbitration, the IBA Rules are justified in keeping 
it mostly intact. Consequently, tribunals are largely free to accept any evidence they deem 
relevant, as well as request and order the production of such evidence when necessary. In 
addition, tribunals are responsible for interpreting the requirements for document 
production requests as well as the objections to them. This effectively allows tribunals to 
maintain the effectiveness, fairness and proportionality of the evidence procedures. 
However, the IBA Rules do not give tribunals much in the way of enforcement power. 
While this can certainly mean that the authority of the tribunals is somewhat diminished, 
the differences in, for example, court assistance offered to arbitral tribunals between states 
and legal systems do not allow the IBA Rules to impose such authority on tribunals. 
However, arbitrators are not completely without means to enforce their orders. 
The IBA Rules provide tribunals with the authority to draw adverse inference when a party 
refuses to comply with a production order. While adverse inference is more a form of 
indirect evidence drawn from the lack of evidence rather than an actual sanction, it still 
serves to both deter and sanction non-compliance. While the IBA Rules provide a 
framework for drawing adverse inference, they do not offer much advice for tribunals as to 
when drawing adverse inference can be justified. Therefore, arbitrators should be careful 
when drawing adverse inference, and especially take care to always assess the inferences 
drawn in the light of the overall evidence provided in a case. Tribunals should also make 
sure to give advance notice when considering drawing adverse inference, as this ensures 
that due process is respected. Consequently, it would not be out of place for the IBA Rules 
to include a requirement for tribunals to give advance notice, as there seems to be little 
reason to exclude such a provision from the rules. 
Arguably, the most significant addition to the IBA Rules is the duty to act in good faith. 
While the actual duty cannot be considered a novel addition to international arbitration 
regime, the possibility of cost allocation based on breaches of good faith certainly gives 
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teeth to the basic principle of the preamble. As good faith has no single accepted 
interpretation in international arbitration, the IBA Rules are justified in not attempting to 
give it one. However, good faith should not be interpreted as broadening the evidence 
production duties of the parties beyond that which is established by article 3 of the IBA 
Rules. When combined with the possibility to impose sanctions, the lack of definition for 
good faith becomes difficult to ignore. The current rules leave it completely up to debate 
what constitutes a breach of good faith, and thus what kind of conduct can result in 
assigning more costs to a certain party. While this can be argued to diminish the 
predictability of evidentiary proceedings in international arbitration, it is not, at the 
moment, necessary for the IBA Rules to include any further specific provisions on good 
faith. Good faith should be interpreted within the context of the IBA Rules as being 
supplementary to the provisions of the rules, instead of overriding them. Consequently, the 
current rules promote good faith conduct and allow breaches of good faith to be taken into 
account, yet still retain the characteristic flexibility of the IBA Rules. However, this makes 
it all the more important for arbitral tribunals and parties to negotiate and agree on 
evidence procedures, and at least discuss what constitutes a breach of good faith in their 
respective arbitration. Additionally, tribunals should only assign compensatory costs based 
on breaches of the duty to act in good faith in evidence production, while further cost 
allocation should always be based on the conduct of the parties as a whole during all 
aspects of the arbitration. For now, the IBA Rules should stay content to include a 
framework for sanctioning breaches of good faith, which in turn might in the future help 
give rise to more specific harmonised procedures. 
Interestingly, while flexibility is certainly one of the greatest benefits of the IBA Rules, it 
is also their greatest drawback: although the flexibility of the rules allows for them to be 
applied to almost any arbitration regardless of the nationalities of the parties and 
arbitrators, it also causes the rules to leave a lot of the specifics open to interpretation. 
Consequently, parties should use the IBA Rules as guidelines rather than apply them as 
binding. However, should parties wish to adopt the rules as binding, they should make an 
effort to discuss the specifics of the procedure with each other and the tribunal. All in all, 
the new IBA Rules continue to offer a flexible, efficient and fair framework for document 
production in international arbitration. This has not changed from the 1999 iteration of the 
rules, and the new rules certainly possess the potential to maintain or surpass the success of 
the previous version. 
